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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case involves the availability of federal historic 
rehabilitation tax credits (“HRTCs”) in connection with the 
restoration of an iconic venue known as the “East Hall” (also 
known as “Historic Boardwalk Hall”), located on the 
boardwalk in Atlantic City, New Jersey.  The New Jersey 
Sports and Exposition Authority (“NJSEA”), a state agency 
which owned a leasehold interest in the East Hall, was tasked 
with restoring it.  After learning of the market for HRTCs 
among corporate investors, and of the additional revenue 
which that market could bring to the state through a 
syndicated partnership with one or more investors, NJSEA 
created a New Jersey limited liability company, Historic 
Boardwalk Hall, LLC (“HBH”), and subsequently sold a 
membership interest in HBH
1
 to a wholly-owned subsidiary 
                                              
1
 An LLC “offers the best of both worlds – the limited 
liability of a corporation and the favorable tax treatment of a 
partnership.”  Canterbury Holdings, LLC v. Comm’r, 98 
T.C.M. (CCH) 60, 61 n.1 (2009).  Generally, an LLC is a 
pass-through entity that does not pay federal income tax.  See 
I.R.C. § 701; Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a).  Rather, profits 
and losses “pass through” the LLC to its owners, called 
members, who pay individual income tax on their allocable 
shares of the tax items.  See I.R.C. §§ 701-04, 6031.  
Although an LLC with just one owner is, for tax purposes, 
disregarded as an entity separate from its owner for tax 
purposes, an LLC with two or more members is classified as 
a partnership for tax purposes unless it elects to be treated as 
a corporation.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1).  Once HBH, 
as a duly formed New Jersey limited liability company, had 
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of Pitney Bowes, Inc. (“PB”).2  Through a series of 
agreements, the transactions that were executed to admit PB 
as a member of HBH and to transfer ownership of NJSEA‟s 
property interest in the East Hall to HBH were designed so 
that PB could earn the HRTCs generated from the East Hall 
rehabilitation.  The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) 
determined that HBH was simply a vehicle to impermissibly 
transfer HRTCs from NJSEA to PB and that all HRTCs taken 
by PB should be reallocated to NJSEA.
3
  The Tax Court 
disagreed, and sustained the allocation of the HRTCs to PB 
through its membership interest in HBH.   Because we agree 
with the IRS‟s contention that PB, in substance, was not a 
bona fide partner in HBH, we will reverse the decision of the 
Tax Court.  
                                                                                                     
two members, it did not elect to be treated as a corporation 
and thus was classified as a partnership for tax purposes for 
the tax years in which it had more than one member.  Thus, as 
the parties do, we refer to HBH as a partnership when 
analyzing whether one of its stated members was a bona fide 
partner. 
2
 PB‟s membership interest in HBH was through PB 
Historic Renovations, LLC, whose sole member was Pitney 
Bowes Credit Corp.  At all relevant times, Pitney Bowes 
Credit Corp. was a wholly-owned subsidiary of PB.  For ease 
of reference, we will refer to PB Historic Renovations, LLC, 
Pitney Bowes Credit Corp., and PB as “PB.”  
3
 The alphabet-soup of acronyms in this case is 
perhaps beyond parody, but the acronyms are a more efficient 
means of referring to various corporate and state entities, as 
well as the tax credits and other concepts, so we reluctantly 
fall into the soup. 
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I. Background 
 
A. Background of the HRTC Statute 
 
We begin by describing the history of the HRTC 
statute.  Under Section 47 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986, as amended (the “Code” or the “I.R.C.”), a taxpayer is 
eligible for a tax credit equal to “20 percent of the qualified 
rehabilitation expenditures [“QREs”4] with respect to any 
certified historic structure.
[5]”  I.R.C. § 47(a)(2).  HRTCs are 
only available to the owner of the property interest.  See 
generally I.R.C. § 47; see also I.R.S. Publication, Tax Aspects 
of Historic Preservation, at 1 (Oct. 2000), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/faqrehab.pdf.  In other words, 
the Code does not permit HRTCs to be sold. 
                                              
4
 The Code defines a QRE as: 
[A]ny amount properly chargeable to [a] capital 
account – (i) for property for which 
depreciation is allowable under [I.R.C. §] 168 
and which is – (I) nonresidential real property, 
(II) residential real property, (III) real property 
which has a class life of more than 12.5 years, 
or (IV) an addition or improvement to property 
described in subclause (I), (II), or (III), and (ii) 
in connection with the rehabilitation of a 
qualified rehabilitated building. 
I.R.C. § 47(c)(2)(A). 
5
 The Code defines a “certified historic structure” as 
“any building (and its structural components) which – (i) is 
listed in the National Register, or (ii) is located in a registered 
historic district and is certified by the Secretary of the Interior 
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The idea of promoting historic rehabilitation projects 
can be traced back to the enactment of the National Historic 
Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 9156 
(1966), wherein Congress emphasized the importance of 
preserving “historic properties significant to the Nation‟s 
heritage,” 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(3).  Its purpose was to “remedy 
the dilemma that „historic properties significant to the 
Nation‟s heritage are being lost or substantially altered, often 
inadvertently, with increasing frequency.‟”  Pye v. United 
States, 269 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting 16 U.S.C. 
§ 470(b)(3)).  Among other things, the National Historic 
Preservation Act set out a process “which require[d] federal 
agencies with the authority to license an undertaking „to take 
into account the effect of the undertaking on any … site … 
that is … eligible for inclusion in the National Register‟ prior 
to issuing the license.”  Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 470f).  It also 
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to “expand and 
maintain a National Register of Historic Places.”  16 U.S.C. 
§ 470a(a)(1)(A). 
 
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 furthered the goals of the 
1966 legislation by creating new tax incentives for private 
sector investment in certified historic buildings.  See Tax 
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 
(1976).  The pertinent provisions of the 1976 Act indicate that 
Congress wanted to encourage the private sector to restore 
historic buildings, and, to provide that encouragement, it 
established incentives that were similar to the tax incentives 
for building new structures.  See, e.g., 122 Cong. Rec. 34320 
                                                                                                     
to the Secretary as being of historic significance to the 
district.”  I.R.C. § 47(c)(3). 
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(1976).  Specifically, to equalize incentives affecting the 
restoration of historic structures and the construction of new 
buildings, it included a provision allowing for the 
amortization of rehabilitation expenditures over five years, or, 
alternatively, an accelerated method of depreciation with 
respect to the entire depreciable basis of the rehabilitated 
property.  See I.R.S. Publication, Rehabilitation Tax Credit, at 
1-2 (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
mssp/rehab.pdf (hereinafter referred to as “IRS- Rehab”).   
 
The Revenue Act of 1978 went further to incent the 
restoration of historic buildings.  It made a 10% rehabilitation 
credit available in lieu of the five-year amortization period 
provided by the 1976 Act.  See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978); see also IRS-Rehab, at 1-2.  
In 1981, Congress expanded the rehabilitation credit to three 
tiers, so that a taxpayer could qualify for up to a 25% credit 
for certain historic rehabilitations.  See Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981); see 
also IRS-Rehab, at 1-2. 
 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 made extensive changes 
to the tax law, including the removal of many tax benefits that 
had been available to real estate investors.   See Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986); see 
also Staff of J. Comm. on Tax‟n, 99th Cong., General 
Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Comm. Print. 
1987) (hereinafter referred to as “General Explanation of 
TRA 86”).  The HRTC survived, although it was reduced to 
its modern form of a two-tier system with a 20% credit for 
QREs incurred in renovating a certified historic structure, and 
a 10% credit for QREs incurred in renovating a qualified 
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rehabilitated building
6
 other than a certified historic structure.  
See Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 251, 100 Stat. at 2183; see 
also I.R.C. § 47.  A Congressional report for the 1986 Act 
discussed the rationale for keeping the HRTC: 
 
                                              
6
 The Code defines a “qualified rehabilitated building” 
as: 
[A]ny building (and its structural components) 
if – (i) such building has been substantially 
rehabilitated, (ii) such building was placed in 
service before the beginning of the 
rehabilitation, (iii) in the case of any building 
other than a certified historic structure, in the 
rehabilitation process – (I) 50 percent or more 
of the existing external walls of such building 
are retained in place as external walls, (II) 75 
percent or more of the existing external walls of 
such building are retained in place as internal or 
external walls, and (III) 75 percent or more of 
the existing internal structural framework of 
such building is retained in place, and (iv) 
depreciation (or amortization in lieu of 
depreciation) is allowable with respect to such 
building.  
I.R.C. § 47(c)(1)(A).  Additionally, “[i]n the case of a 
building other than a certified historic structure, a 
building shall not be a qualified rehabilitated building 
unless the building was first placed in service before 
1936.”  Id. § 47(c)(1)(B). 
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In 1981, the Congress restructured and 
increased the tax credit for rehabilitation 
expenditures [because it] was concerned that the 
tax incentives provided to investments in new 
structures (e.g., accelerated cost recovery) 
would have the undesirable effect of reducing 
the relative attractiveness of the prior-law 
incentives to rehabilitate and modernize older 
structures, and might lead investors to neglect 
older structures and relocate their businesses.   
The Congress concluded that the 
incentives granted to rehabilitations in 1981 
remain justified.  Such incentives are needed 
because the social and aesthetic values of 
rehabilitating and preserving older structures 
are not necessarily taken into account in 
investors‟ profit projections.  A tax incentive is 
needed because market forces might otherwise 
channel investments away from such projects 
because of the extra costs of undertaking 
rehabilitations of older or historic buildings. 
 General Explanation of TRA 86, at 149.   
 
Evidently mindful of how the tax incentives it had 
offered might be abused, Congress in 2010 codified the 
“economic substance doctrine,” which it defined as “the 
common law doctrine under which tax benefits … with 
respect to a transaction are not allowable if the transaction 
does not have economic substance or lacks a business 
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purpose.”7  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A).  At the same time, 
however, Congress was at pains to emphasize that the HRTC 
was preserved.  A Congressional report noted: 
 
If the realization of the tax benefits of a 
transaction is consistent with the Congressional 
purpose or plan that the tax benefits were 
designed by Congress to effectuate, it is not 
intended that such tax benefits be disallowed.  
…  Thus, for example, it is not intended that a 
tax credit (e.g., … section 47[, which provides 
for HRTCs,] …) be disallowed in a transaction 
pursuant to which, in form and substance, a 
                                              
7
 Specifically, the codification of the economic 
substance doctrine provides:  
In the case of any transaction to which the 
economic substance doctrine is relevant, such 
transaction shall be treated as having economic 
substance only if … (A) the transaction changes 
in a meaningful way (apart from Federal 
income tax effects) the taxpayer‟s economic 
position, and (B) the taxpayer has a substantial 
purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) 
for entering into such transaction.   
I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1).  Section 7701(o) applies to all 
transactions entered into after March 30, 2010.  Thus, the 
common-law version of the economic substance doctrine, and 
not § 7701(o), applies to the transaction at issue here. 
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taxpayer makes the type of investment or 
undertakes the type of activity that the credit 
was intended to encourage. 
Staff of J. Comm. on Tax‟n, Technical Explanation of the 
Revenue Provisions of the “Reconciliation Act of 2010,” as 
amended, In Combination with the “Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act,” at 152 n.344 (Comm. Print 2010) 
(emphasis added).  In sum, the HRTC statute is a deliberate 
decision to skew the neutrality of the tax system to encourage 
taxable entities to invest, both in form and substance, in 
historic rehabilitation projects.   
 
B. Factual Background of the East Hall 
 Renovation 
 
1. NJSEA Background 
 
In 1971, the State of New Jersey formed NJSEA to 
build, own, and operate the Meadowlands Sports Complex in 
East Rutherford, New Jersey.  The State legislature expanded 
NJSEA‟s jurisdiction in 1992 to build, own, and operate a 
new convention center in Atlantic City and to acquire, 
renovate, and operate the East Hall.  Completed in 1929, the 
East Hall was famous for hosting the annual Miss America 
Pageant, and, in 1987, it was added to the National Register 
of Historic Places as a National Historic Landmark.  
 
In October 1992, before renovations on the East Hall 
began, NJSEA obtained a 35-year leasehold interest in the 
property for $1 per year from the owner, the Atlantic County 
Improvement Authority.  About a month later, NJSEA 
entered into an agreement with the Atlantic City Convention 
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Center Authority, the then-operator of the East Hall, to 
operate both the East Hall and the new convention center.  In 
July 1995, NJSEA and the Atlantic City Convention Center 
Authority handed over management responsibility for both 
the East Hall and the yet-to-be-completed convention center 
to a private entity, Spectacor Management Group 
(“Spectacor”).     
 
2. Commencement of the East Hall   
   Renovation 
 
 Once construction started on the new convention 
center in the early 1990s, NJSEA began planning for the 
future of the East Hall and decided to convert it into a special 
events facility.  That conversion was initially anticipated to 
cost $78,522,000.  Renovations were to be performed in four 
phases, with the entire project expected to be completed in 
late 2001.   
 
The renovation project began in December of 1998.  
By that time, NJSEA had entered into agreements with the 
New Jersey Casino Reinvestment Development Authority
8
 
pursuant to which the Casino Reinvestment Development 
Authority agreed to reimburse NJSEA up to $4,146,745 for 
certain pre-design expenses and up to $32,574,000 for costs 
incurred in the East Hall renovation.  In a March 1999 
                                              
8
 The Casino Reinvestment Development Authority, as 
described by the Tax Court, “is a State agency created by the 
New Jersey State Legislature that uses funds generated from 
governmental charges imposed on the casino industry for 
economic development and community projects throughout 
the State.”  (Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 11 n.4.) 
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document prepared in connection with a separate bond 
issuance,
9
 NJSEA noted that it had received grants from the 
Casino Reinvestment Development Authority to pay for the 
first phase of the East Hall renovation and that “[f]unding for 
the remaining cost of the project … is expected to be obtained 
through the issuance by [NJSEA] of Federally Taxable State 
Contract Bonds.”  (J.A. at 708.)  In June 1999, NJSEA issued 
$49,915,000 in State Contract Bonds to fund the East Hall 
renovation.     
 
The first two phases of the renovation were completed 
prior to the Miss America Pageant held in September 1999, 
and Phase 3 began the following month.  Through 1999, 
NJSEA had entered into rehabilitation contracts for 
approximately $38,700,000, and had expended $28,000,000 
of that amount.  Also at about that time, the estimate of the 
total cost of the project increased to $90,600,000.  NJSEA‟s 
1999 annual report stated that the Casino Reinvestment 
Development Authority had agreed to reimburse NJSEA for 
“all costs in excess of bond proceeds for the project.”  (Id. at 
1714.)  Thus, by the end of 1999, between the proceeds it had 
received from the bond issuance and funds provided – or to 
be provided – by the Casino Reinvestment Development 
Authority, NJSEA had assurances that the East Hall 
rehabilitation project was fully funded. 
 
                                              
9
 The proceeds from that bond issuance by NJSEA, 
described as the 1999 Luxury Tax Bonds, were not directly 
applied to the East Hall renovation.  Rather, the 1999 Luxury 
Tax Bonds were issued to effect the refunding of certain 
amounts from an earlier bond issuance.  
 18 
 
3. Finding a Partner 
 
a) The Proposal from Sovereign 
 Capital Resources  
 
In August 1998, a few months prior to the beginning of 
renovations on the East Hall, Paul Hoffman from Sovereign 
Capital Resources (“Sovereign”)10 wrote to NJSEA regarding 
a “consulting proposal … for the sale of the historic 
rehabilitation tax credits expected to be generated” by the 
East Hall rehabilitation.  (Id. at 691.)  That proposal was 
“designed to give [NJSEA representatives] a better 
perspective on the structure of the historic tax credit sale, as 
well as the [potential] financial benefits (estimated in excess 
of $11 million) to the project.”  (Id.)  As an initial summary, 
Hoffman stated that “the best way to view the equity 
generated by a sale of the historic tax credits is to think of it 
as an $11 million interest only loan that has no term and may 
not require any principal repayment.”  (Id.)  Hoffman noted 
that although NJSEA, as a tax-exempt entity, would have no 
use for the 20% federal tax credit generated by QREs 
incurred in renovating historic structures, there were “entities 
that actively invest in [HRTC] properties … and are generally 
Fortune 500 corporations with substantial federal income tax 
liabilities.”  (Id. at 692.)  Hoffman explained that because 
“[t]he [HRTC] is earned when the building is placed into 
service” and “cannot be transferred after the fact,” “the 
                                              
10
 Sovereign describes itself as “a boutique consulting 
firm that facilitates equity financing and offers financial 
advisory services for historic rehabilitation … tax credit 
transactions.”   (J.A. at 696.) 
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corporate investor should be admitted into the partnership that 
owns the project as soon as possible.”  (Id.)   
 
Hoffman next sketched out the proposed transactions 
that would allow NJSEA to bring an investor interested in 
HRTCs into co-ownership of the East Hall and yet provide 
for NJSEA to “retain its long-term interests in the [East 
Hall].”  (Id. at 693.)  First, NJSEA would sublease its interest 
in the East Hall to a newly created partnership in which 
NJSEA would be the general partner and a corporate investor 
would be the limited partner.  The sublease agreement would 
be treated as a sale for tax purposes since the sublease would 
extend longer than the useful life of the property under tax 
rules.  Next, that partnership would allocate 99% of its profit 
and loss to the limited partner corporate investor so that such 
investor could claim substantially all of the tax credits, but 
only be allocated a “small portion” of the cash flow.  (Id. at 
694.)  Finally, after a sufficient waiting period, NJSEA would 
be given a purchase option to buy-out the corporate investor‟s 
interest.   With all that said, however, Hoffman warned that 
“[c]orporate purchasers of [HRTCs] rarely accept 
construction risk,” and “[t]ypically … provide no more than 
10% of their equity to the partnership during the construction 
period.”  (Id. at 695.)  Thus, Hoffman “recommend[ed] that 
NJSEA plan to issue enough bonds to meet the construction 
financing requirements of the project.”  (Id.)   
 
Hoffman then provided a valuation of the HRTCs.  He 
estimated that NJSEA could expect an investor to contribute 
approximately $0.80 to $0.90 per each dollar of HRTC 
allocated to the investor.  In valuing the HRTCs, Hoffman 
“assume[d] that NJSEA would like to minimize the cash 
distribution to the investor and retain long-term ownership of 
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[the East Hall].”  (Id.)  He also listed four “standard 
guarantees” that “[i]nvestors in the tax credit industry” would 
“require” as part of the transaction: (1) a construction 
completion guaranty; (2) an operating deficit guaranty; (3) a 
tax indemnity; and (4) an environmental indemnity.  (Id. at 
696.)  Additionally, Hoffman noted that “the investor will 
expect that either NJSEA or the State of New Jersey be 
obligated to make debt service on the bond issuance if 
operating revenue is insufficient to support the debt 
payments.”  (Id.) 
 
NJSEA decided to further explore the benefits 
described by Sovereign.  In March 1999, NJSEA issued a 
request for proposal (as supplemented by an addendum on 
April 30, 1999, the “RFP”) from “qualified financial advisors 
… in connection with a proposed historic rehabilitation tax 
credit transaction … relating to the rehabilitation of the East 
Hall.”  (Id. at 710.)  The RFP provided that the selected 
candidate would “be required to prepare a Tax Credit offering 
Memorandum, market the tax credits to potential investors 
and successfully close a partnership agreement with the 
proposed tax credit investor.”  (Id. at 721.)  In June 1999, 
after receiving four responses, NJSEA selected Sovereign as 
its “[f]inancial [a]rranger” for the “Historic Tax Credit 
transaction.”  (Id. at 750.)   
 
b) The Initial and Revised Five-Year 
 Projections 
 
In September 1999, as the second phase of the East 
Hall renovation had just been completed, Spectacor, as the 
East Hall‟s operator, produced draft five-year financial 
projections for the East Hall beginning for the 2002 fiscal 
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year.
11
  Those projections estimated that the East Hall would 
incur a net operating loss of approximately $1.7 million for 
each of those five years.  Sovereign received a copy of the 
projections, and, in a memo dated October 1, 1999, responded 
that it was “cautious about [Spectacor‟s] figures as they might 
prove excessively conservative.”  (Id. at 793.)  In a 
December 10, 1999 memo to NJSEA representatives, 
Sovereign said that, for the yet-to-be-created partnership 
between NJSEA and an HRTC investor to earn the desired 
tax credits, the partnership “should be able to reasonably 
show that it is a going concern.”12  (Id. at 804.)  To that end, 
Sovereign suggested that “[t]o improve the operating results, 
NJSEA could explore shifting the burden of some of the 
operating expenses from the [partnership] to the Land Lessor 
(either [the Atlantic County Improvement Authority] or 
NJSEA depending upon [how the partnership was 
structured]).”  (Id.)  
 
Approximately two months later, Sovereign received 
revised estimates prepared by Spectacor.  Those pro forma 
                                              
11
 Because it was projected that the East Hall 
renovation would be completed in late 2001, fiscal year 2002 
was anticipated to be the East Hall‟s first full year of 
operations. 
12
 A “going concern” is “[a] commercial enterprise 
actively engag[ed] in business with the expectation of 
indefinite continuance.”  Black‟s Law Dictionary 712 (8th ed. 
2004).  Evidently and understandably, Sovereign viewed year 
after year of large losses from the operations of the East Hall 
as inconsistent with an ordinary expectation of indefinite 
continuance. 
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statements projected much smaller net operating losses, 
ranging from approximately $396,000 in 2002 to $16,000 in 
2006.  Within two weeks, Spectacor made additional 
revisions to those projections which resulted in estimated net 
operating income for those five years, ranging from 
approximately $716,000 in 2002 to $1.24 million in 2006.  
About 90% of the remarkable financial turnaround the East 
Hall thus was projected to enjoy on paper was due to the 
removal of all projected utilities expenses for each of the five 
years ($1 million in 2002, indexed for 3% inflation each year 
thereafter).  When the accountants for the project, Reznick, 
Fedder & Silverman (“Reznick”), included those utilities 
expenses in their compiled projections one week later, 
Sovereign instructed them to “[t]ake [the] $1MM Utility Cost 
completely out of Expenses, [because] NJSEA [would] pay at 
[the] upper tier and [then] we should have a working 
operating model.”  (Id. at 954.)   
 
c) Confidential Offering 
 Memorandum 
 
On March 16, 2000, Sovereign prepared a 174-page 
confidential information memorandum (the “Confidential 
Memorandum” or the “Memo”) which it sent to 19 potential 
investors and which was titled “The Sale of Historic Tax 
Credits Generated by the Renovation of the Historic Atlantic 
City Boardwalk Convention Hall.”  (Id. at 955.)  Although the 
executive summary in the Confidential Memorandum stated 
that the East Hall renovation would cost approximately $107 
million, the budget attached to the Memo indicated that the 
“total construction costs” of the project were $90,596,088.  
(Id. at 1035).  Moreover, the Memo stated that “[t]he 
rehabilitation [was] being funded entirely by [NJSEA].”  (Id. 
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at 962).  The difference between the $107 million “estimated 
… renovation” (id. at 961), and the “total construction costs” 
of $90,596,088 was, as the Memo candidly put it, the 
“[p]roceeds from the sale of the historic tax credits” (id. at 
963).  The Memo did not contemplate that those proceeds, 
estimated to be approximately $16,354,000, would be applied 
to “total construction costs” but rather indicated that the funds 
would be used for three things: (1) payment of a $14,000,000 
“development fee” to NJSEA; (2) payment of $527,080 in 
legal, accounting, and syndication fees related to the tax-
credit transaction; and (3) the establishment of a $1,826,920 
working capital reserve.   
 
The Memo also provided financial projections through 
2009.  Those projections assumed that the investor would 
receive a 3% priority distribution (the “Preferred Return”) 
from available cash flow on its $16,354,000 contribution, 
which contemporaneous NJSEA executive committee notes 
described as “required by tax rules.”  (Id. at 1135.)  The 
financial projections provided for sufficient net operating 
income – ranging from $715,867 in 2002 to $880,426 in 2009 
–  to pay a portion of the Preferred Return on an annual basis 
(varying from $465,867 in 2002 to $490,620 in 2009), but 
also showed substantial tax losses through 2009 that were 
mainly attributable to depreciation deductions.   
 
d) Selection of Pitney Bowes 
 
Four entities, including PB, responded to the 
Confidential Memorandum and submitted offers “regarding 
the purchase of the historic tax credits anticipated to be 
generated by the renovation” of the East Hall.  (Id. at 1143.)  
In a May 2000 letter supplementing its offer, PB 
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recommended that NJSEA fund the construction costs 
through a loan to the partnership, rather than in the form of 
capital contributions, so that “the managing member could 
obtain a pre-tax profit and therefore the partnership would be 
respected as such for US tax purposes.”  (Id. at 1145.)  
 
On July 13, 2000, PB and NJSEA executed a letter of 
intent (“LOI”) reflecting their agreement that PB would make 
“capital contributions”13 totaling $16.4 million over four 
installments in exchange for a 99.9% membership interest in 
HBH, which NJSEA had recently formed.  The LOI further 
indicated that PB would also make an “Investor Loan” of $1.1 
million.  Consistent with PB‟s earlier recommendation, the 
LOI said that NJSEA, as the managing member retaining a 
0.1% interest in HBH, would provide approximately $90 
million in the form of two loans: (1) a purchase money 
obligation that represented the amount of QREs incurred by 
NJSEA in the East Hall renovation prior to PB‟s investment 
(the “Acquisition Loan”); and (2) a loan to finance the 
remainder of the projected QREs (the “Construction Loan”).  
According to the LOI, it was anticipated that the project 
would qualify for a minimum of $17,602,667 in HRTCs: 
$9,379,981 in 2000 and $8,222,686 in 2001.  The LOI also 
noted that a 3% Preferred Return would be paid to PB.  
Although the LOI contemplated that PB would receive 99.9% 
of any available cash flow, HBH‟s financial projections from 
2000 to 2042 forecasted no cash flow available for 
distribution during that time frame.  Similarly, while the LOI 
                                              
13
 Although we use the term “capital contributions” 
because that was the term used by the parties in this context, 
we do not attribute any dispositive legal significance to it as 
used herein.  
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mentioned that PB would receive 99.9% of the net proceeds 
from a sale of HBH, a pre-closing memo from NJSEA‟s 
outside counsel to NJSEA suggested that, “[d]ue to the 
structure of the transaction,” the fair market value of PB‟s 
interest in HBH would be insignificant.  (J.A. at 1162.)  Thus, 
for its investment of $17.5 million ($16.4 million in capital 
contributions and the $1.1 million Investor Loan), PB would 
receive, in addition to the 3% Preferred Return, 99.9% of the 
approximately $17.6 million worth of HRTCs that would be 
generated from the QREs. 
 
e) Additional Revisions to Financial 
 Projections 
 
Prior to the closing on PB‟s commitment to purchase a 
membership interest in HBH, an accountant from Reznick 
who was preparing HBH‟s financial projections, sent a memo 
to Hoffman indicating that the two proposed loans from 
NJSEA to HBH “ha[d] been set up to be paid from available 
cash flow” but that “[t]here was not sufficient cash to 
amortize this debt.”  (Id. at 1160.)  To remedy the problem, 
Hoffman instructed the accountant to increase the projection 
of baseline revenues in 2002 by $1 million by adding a new 
revenue source of $750,000 titled “naming rights,” and by 
increasing both “parking revenue” and “net concession 
revenue” by $125,000 each.  Additionally, whereas the initial 
projections assumed that baseline revenues and expenses 
would both increase by 3% on an annual basis, the revised 
projections used at closing assumed that baseline revenues 
would increase by 3.5% annually, while maintaining the 3% 
estimate for the annual increases in baseline expenses.   With 
those modifications, Reznick was able to project that, even 
after paying PB its 3% Preferred Return, HBH could fully pay 
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off the Acquisition Loan by 2040, at which point HBH would 
then be able to make principal payments on the Construction 
Loan.   
 
Also prior to closing, by moving certain expenditures 
from the “non-eligible” category to the “eligible” category,14 
Reznick increased by about $9 million the amount of 
projected QREs that the East Hall renovation would generate.  
That increase in QREs resulted in an approximately $1.8 
million increase in projected HRTCs from $17,602,667 to 
$19,412,173.  That uptick in HRTCs, in turn, resulted in an 
increase in PB‟s anticipated capital contribution from 
$16,400,000 to $18,195,797.
15
   
 
4. Closing 
 
On September 14, 2000,
16
 NJSEA and PB executed 
various documents to implement the negotiated transaction, 
and PB made an initial contribution of $650,000 to HBH.   
                                              
14
 Reznick apparently used the terms “eligible” and 
“non-eligible” construction expenditures to differentiate 
between costs that were QREs and those that were not. 
15
 The LOI provided that PB‟s contribution would be 
“adjusted … upward by $0.995 per additional $1.00 of 
Historic Tax Credit in the event that … the QREs for the 
Project after 1999 support[ed] Historic Tax Credits in excess 
of the projected Historic Tax Credits.”  (J.A. at 1148.) 
16
 Although it is unclear from the record exactly when 
Phase 3 of the four-phase rehabilitation project was 
completed, the March 2000 Confidential Memorandum 
estimated that Phase 3, which began in October 1999, would 
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a) The HBH Operating Agreement 
 
The primary agreement used to admit PB as a member 
of HBH and to restate HBH‟s governing provisions was the 
amended and restated operating agreement (the “AREA”).  
The AREA stated that the purpose of HBH was “to acquire, 
develop, finance, rehabilitate, own, maintain, operate, license, 
lease, and sell or otherwise dispose of a[n] 87-year 
subleasehold interest in the Historic East Hall … for use as a 
special events facility.”  (Id. at 157.)  The AREA provided 
that PB would hold a 99.9% ownership interest as the 
“Investor Member,” and NJSEA would hold a 0.1% 
ownership interest as the “Managing Member.”  The AREA 
also provided that PB, in addition to its $650,000 initial 
contribution, would make three additional capital 
contributions totaling $17,545,797 (collectively, with the 
initial capital contribution, $18,195,797).  Those additional 
contributions were contingent upon the completion of certain 
project-related events, including verification of the amount of 
rehabilitation costs that had been incurred to date that would 
be classified as QREs to generate HRTCs.  According to 
Section 5.01(c)(v) of the AREA, each of the four 
contributions were to be used by HBH to pay down the 
principal of the Acquisition Loan contemplated by the LOI.    
Pursuant to the AREA, NJSEA, in addition to providing HBH 
                                                                                                     
be completed by August 2000.  That same memo stated that 
NJSEA anticipated that the entire renovation would be 
completed by December 2001, and, in fact, the East Hall 
reopened in October 2001.  Thus, it is likely that Phase 3 of 
the renovation was entirely completed by the time NJSEA 
and PB executed the various documents effecting PB‟s 
investment in HBH.  
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with the Acquisition Loan and the Construction Loan, agreed 
to pay all “Excess Development Costs” (the “Completion 
Guaranty”),17 fund all operating deficits through interest-free 
loans to HBH (the “Operating Deficit Guaranty”), and 
indemnify PB against any loss incurred by PB as a result of 
any liability arising from “Hazardous Materials” relating to 
the East Hall,
18
 including remediation costs (the 
“Environmental Guaranty”). 
                                              
17
 The AREA defined the term “Excess Development 
Costs” as “all expenditures in excess of the proceeds of the 
[Acquisition and Construction] Loans and the Capital 
Contributions of the Members which are required to complete 
rehabilitation of the [East] Hall,” including, but not limited to, 
“(1) any interest, taxes, and property insurance premiums not 
payable from proceeds of the Loans or Capital Contributions, 
and (2) any construction cost overruns and the cost of any 
change orders which are not funded from proceeds of the 
Loans or Capital Contributions of the Members.”  (J.A. at 
161.) 
18
 The term “Hazardous Materials” under the AREA 
included, among other things, “any „hazardous substance‟, 
„pollutant‟ or „contaminant‟ as defined in any applicable 
federal statute, law, rule or regulation now or hereafter in 
effect … or any amendment thereto or any replacement 
thereof or in any statute or regulation relating to the 
environment now or hereafter in effect,” and “any hazardous 
substance, hazardous waste, residual waste or solid waste, as 
those terms are now or hereafter defined in any applicable 
state or local law, rule or regulation or in any statute or 
regulation relating to the environment now or hereafter in 
effect.”  (J.A. at 162.) 
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The AREA also set forth a detailed order of priority of 
distributions from HBH‟s cash flow.  After distributing any 
title insurance proceeds or any environmental insurance 
proceeds to PB, cash flow was to be distributed as follows: 
(1) to PB for certain repayments on its $1.1 million “Investor 
Loan” contemplated by the LOI; (2) to PB and NJSEA, in 
accordance with their respective membership interests, until 
PB received an amount equal to the current and any accrued 
and unpaid 3% Preferred Return as mentioned in the LOI; (3) 
to PB for an amount equal to the income tax liability 
generated by income earned by HBH that was allocated to 
PB, if any; (4) to NJSEA for an amount equal to the current 
and any accrued and unpaid payments of interest and 
principal owed on the Acquisition Loan and the Construction 
Loan; (5) to NJSEA in an amount equal to any loans it made 
to HBH pursuant to the Operating Deficit Guaranty; and (6) 
the balance, if any, to PB and NJSEA, in accordance with 
their respective membership interests.   
 
Additionally, the AREA provided the parties with 
certain repurchase rights and obligations.
19
  In the event that 
NJSEA desired to take certain actions that were prohibited 
under the AREA or otherwise required it to obtain PB‟s 
consent to take such actions, NJSEA could instead – without 
the consent of PB – purchase PB‟s interest in HBH.  In the 
papers submitted to us, the ill-fitting name the parties gave to 
this ability of NJSEA to buy out PB without PB‟s consent is 
                                              
19
 Those rights and obligations are distinct from the put 
and call options set forth in separate agreements which were 
executed the same day and which are discussed infra in 
Section 1.B.4.e. 
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the “Consent Option.”  The purchase price under the Consent 
Option is not measured by any fair market value of PB‟s 
interest, if any such value were even to exist, but rather is 
equal to the then-present value of any yet-to-be realized 
projected tax benefits and cash distributions due to PB 
through the end of the five-year tax credit recapture period.
20
  
In the event that NJSEA committed a material default as 
defined by the AREA, PB had the right to compel NJSEA to 
purchase its interest (the “Material Default Option”) for that 
same price.
21
   
 
                                              
20
 In this context, the term “tax credit recapture” is 
apparently used to convey the concept that a taxpayer is 
required to repay to the IRS a portion of a tax credit it had 
previously claimed with respect to a property interest because 
that property interest did not continue to qualify for the tax 
credit for the requisite period of time.  Specifically, if the East 
Hall were disposed of or “otherwise cease[d] to be [an 
HRTC] property with respect to” HBH within five years after 
the East Hall was placed into service, any HRTCs allocated to 
PB through its membership interest in HBH would be 
recaptured by, in effect, increasing PB‟s tax (through its 
membership interest in HBH) by the amount of the total 
HRTCs taken multiplied by a “recapture percentage,” which 
varies based on the holding period of the property.  See I.R.C. 
§ 50(a).  The amount of HRTCs subject to recapture would 
decrease by 20% for each of the first five years after the East 
Hall was placed in service.  See id. § 50(a)(1)(B).   
21
 At the time that the IRS challenged this series of 
transactions, neither the Consent Option nor the Material 
Default Option had been exercised. 
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To protect PB‟s interest, Section 8.08 of the AREA 
mandated that NJSEA obtain a guaranteed investment 
contract (the “Guaranteed Investment Contract”).22  The 
Guaranteed Investment Contract had to be “reasonably 
satisfactory to [PB], in the amount required to secure the 
payment of the purchase price” to be paid by NJSEA in the 
event that NJSEA exercised the option to purchase PB‟s 
interest under another purchase option agreement that NJSEA 
had.
23
  (Id. at 187-88; see supra note 19.)  The AREA also 
provided that the Guaranteed Investment Contract had to be 
obtained on or before the payment of PB‟s second capital 
contribution.  In a memo dated two days prior to closing, 
Sovereign explained to NJSEA that “[t]he [Guaranteed 
Investment Contract] should be sized to pay off the Investor 
Loan of $1.1 million, accrued but unpaid interest on the 
[Investor Loan], and [PB‟s] annual priority distributions.”  
(Id. at 1211.) 
 
                                              
22
 A “guaranteed investment contract” is “[a]n 
investment contract under which an institutional investor 
[here, NJSEA] invests a lump sum … with an insurer that 
promises to return the principal (the lump sum) and a certain 
amount of interest at the contract‟s end.”  Black‟s Law 
Dictionary 845 (8th ed. 2004). 
23
 That option, known as the call option, was one of 
two vehicles (the other being the Consent Option) that was 
available to NJSEA if it wanted to buy out PB‟s interest in 
HBH.  PB had a corresponding put option which gave it the 
right to compel NJSEA to buy out PB‟s interest.  As noted 
earlier, supra note 19, the put and call options are discussed 
infra in Section 1.B.4.e. 
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b) Lease Amendment and Sublease 
 
NJSEA also executed several documents that 
purported to transfer ownership of its interest in the East Hall 
to HBH.  First, NJSEA entered into an amended and restated 
agreement with its lessor, Atlantic County Improvement 
Authority, to extend the term of NJSEA‟s leasehold interest 
in the East Hall from 2027 to 2087.
24
  After that agreement, 
                                              
24
 It appears that the leasehold interest was extended so 
that its term was longer than the depreciable basis of the 
improvements to be made on the East Hall for tax purposes.  
That extension was in accord with Hoffman‟s ultimate plan 
for NJSEA to transfer ownership of the East Hall (for tax 
purposes) to the newly created partnership, a plan he laid out 
in Sovereign‟s consulting proposal to NJSEA (albeit the 
actual lease extension was longer than that suggested in that 
proposal).  (See J.A. at 693 (“Since the useful life of 
commercial improvements is 39.5 years, the tax industry 
consensus is that the sub-lease should be for a period of 50 
years.”).  Extending the lease term beyond the useful life of 
the improvements was necessary so that when NJSEA entered 
into a sublease with HBH in connection with the East Hall, 
HBH, as Hoffman put it, could “be recognized as the „owner‟ 
for tax purposes” (id.), and thus would be eligible to incur 
QREs that, in turn, would generate HRTCs.  See I.R.C. 
§ 47(c)(2)(B)(vi) (“The term „[QRE]‟ does not include …any 
expenditure of a lessee of a building if, on the date the 
rehabilitation is completed, the remaining term of the lease 
(determined without regard to any renewal periods) is less 
than the recovery period determined under [I.R.C. 
§ 168(c)].”).   
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NJSEA and HBH entered into a “Sublease” with NJSEA, as 
landlord, and HBH, as tenant.  (Id. at 413.)   
 
c) Acquisition Loan and 
 Construction Loan 
 
As contemplated in the LOI, NJSEA provided 
financing to HBH in the form of two loans.  First, NJSEA and 
HBH executed a document setting forth the terms of the 
Acquisition Loan, reflecting NJSEA‟s agreement to finance 
the entire purchase price that HBH paid to NJSEA for the 
subleasehold interest in the East Hall, which amounted to 
$53,621,405.  That amount was intended to represent the 
construction costs that NJSEA had incurred with respect to 
the East Hall renovation prior to PB making its investment in 
HBH.  The Acquisition Loan provided for HBH to repay the 
loan in equal annual installments for 39 years, beginning on 
April 30, 2002, with an interest rate of 6.09% per year; 
however, if HBH did not have sufficient cash available to pay 
the annual installments when due, the shortfall would accrue 
without interest and be added to the next annual installment.  
HBH pledged its subleasehold interest in the East Hall as 
security for the Acquisition Loan.   
 
Second, NJSEA and HBH executed a document setting 
forth the terms of the Construction Loan, reflecting NJSEA‟s 
agreement to finance the projected remaining construction 
costs for renovating the East Hall, to be repaid by HBH in 
annual installments for 39 years, beginning on April 30, 2002, 
at an annual interest rate of 0.1%.  Although the parties only 
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anticipated $37,921,036 of additional construction costs,
25
 the 
maximum amount that HBH could withdraw from the 
Construction Loan provided by NJSEA was $57,215,733. 
That difference, $19,294,697, was nearly identical to the total 
investment that PB was to make in HBH ($18,195,797 in 
capital contributions and $1,100,000 for the Investor Loan).  
See infra Section I.B.5.a.  Similar to the Acquisition Loan, the 
Construction Loan provided for equal annual installments out 
of available cash flow, but, if sufficient cash was not 
available, any shortfall would accrue without interest and be 
added to the next annual installment.  HBH gave NJSEA a 
second mortgage on its subleasehold interest in the East Hall 
as security for the Construction Loan.   
 
d) Development Agreement 
 
HBH and NJSEA also entered into a development 
agreement in connection with the ongoing rehabilitation of 
the East Hall.  The agreement stated that HBH had “retained 
[NJSEA as the developer] to use its best efforts to perform 
certain services with respect to the rehabilitation … of the 
[East] Hall … including renovation of the [East] Hall, 
                                              
25
 The final projections prepared during the week prior 
to closing contemplated $27,421,036 of remaining 
construction costs.  During that week, Sovereign sent a memo 
to PB identifying an additional $10.5 million of “[p]otential 
additional expenditure[s]” that included environmental 
remediation costs ($3.0 million), tenant improvements ($2.5 
million), and an additional rehabilitation contingency ($5.0 
million).  (J.A. at 1209.)  If those expenditures were treated as 
QREs, the memo indicated that the transaction would 
generate an additional $2.1 million in HRTCs. 
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acquisition of necessary building permits and other approvals, 
acquisition of financing for the renovations, and acquisition 
of historic housing credits for the renovations.”  (Id. at 267.)  
The agreement noted that “since December 1998, [NJSEA] 
ha[d] been performing certain of [those] services … in 
anticipation of the formation of [HBH].”  (Id.)  The 
agreement provided that HBH would pay a $14,000,000 
development fee to NJSEA, but that fee was not to be earned 
until the rehabilitation was completed.  Prior to the execution 
of the development agreement, as NJSEA was spending over 
$53 million towards the renovation of the East Hall, it did not 
pay itself any development fee or otherwise account for such 
a fee.   
 
e) Purchase Option and Option to 
 Compel  
 
Concurrent with the AREA and the sublease 
agreement, PB and NJSEA entered into a purchase option 
agreement (the “Call Option”) and an agreement to compel 
purchase (the “Put Option”).  The Call Option provides 
NJSEA the right to acquire PB‟s membership interest in 
HBH, and the Put Option provides PB the right to require 
NJSEA to purchase PB‟s membership interest in HBH.  
Under the Call Option, NJSEA had the right to purchase PB‟s 
interest in HBH at any time during the 12-month period 
beginning 60 months after the East Hall was placed in 
service.
26
  If NJSEA did not exercise the Call Option, then PB 
                                              
26
 The 60-month period was likely imposed so that, if 
NJSEA did exercise the Call Option, any of the HRTCs that 
PB had previously been allocated through its membership 
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had the right to exercise the Put Option at any time during the 
12-month period beginning 84 months after the East Hall was 
placed in service.  For both the Put Option and the Call 
Option, the purchase price was set at an amount equal to the 
greater of (1) 99.9% of the fair market value of 100% of the 
membership interests in HBH; or (2) any accrued and unpaid 
Preferred Return due to PB.  As already noted, supra Section 
I.B.4.a, the AREA mandated that NJSEA purchase the 
Guaranteed Investment Contract to secure funding of the 
purchase price of PB‟s membership interest, should either of 
the options be exercised.
27
  
  
f) Tax Benefits Guaranty 
 
As contemplated by the Confidential Memorandum, 
HBH and PB entered into a tax benefits guaranty agreement 
(the “Tax Benefits Guaranty”).  Pursuant to that guaranty, 
upon a “Final Determination of a Tax Benefits Reduction 
Event,”28 HBH agreed to pay to PB an amount equal to the 
                                                                                                     
interest in HBH would not be subject to recapture.  See supra 
note 20. 
27
 Neither of those options were exercised prior to the 
IRS‟s challenge. 
28
 Pursuant to the Tax Benefits Guaranty, a “Tax 
Benefits Reduction Event means as of any Final 
Determination for any taxable year the amount by which the 
Actual Tax Benefits for such year are less than the Projected 
Tax Benefits.”  (J.A. at 300.)  A “Final Determination” was 
defined as the earliest to occur of certain non-construction 
related events which, “with respect to either [HBH] or [PB], 
… result[] in loss of Projected Tax Benefits.”  (Id. at 299.) 
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sum of (1) any reduction in projected tax benefits, “as revised 
by the then applicable Revised Economic Projections,”29 as a 
result of an IRS challenge; (2) any additional tax liability 
incurred by PB from partnership items allocated to it by HBH 
as a result of an IRS challenge; (3) interest and penalties 
imposed by the IRS on PB in connection with any IRS 
challenge; (4) an amount sufficient to compensate PB for 
reasonable third-party legal and administrative expenses 
related to such a challenge, up to $75,000; and (5) an amount 
sufficient to pay any federal income tax liability owed by PB 
on receiving any of the payments listed in (1) through (4).  
(Id. at 300.)  Although HBH was the named obligor of the 
Tax Benefits Guaranty, the agreement provided that “NJSEA 
… shall fund any obligations of [HBH] to [PB]” under the 
Tax Benefits Guaranty.  (Id. at 303.)   
 
5. HBH in Operation 
 
a) Construction in Progress 
 
Pursuant to an Assignment and Assumption 
Agreement executed on the day of closing between NJSEA, 
as assignor, and HBH, as assignee, various agreements and 
contracts – including occupancy agreements, construction 
contracts, architectural drawings, permits, and management 
and service agreements – were assigned to HBH.  HBH 
                                              
29
 The “Revised Economic Projections” refer to the 
revised projections made by Reznick that “reflect the actual 
Tax Credits and federal income tax losses … at the time of 
payment of the Second, Third and Fourth Installments.”  (Id. 
at 300.) 
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opened bank accounts in its name, and it deposited revenues 
and paid expenses through those accounts.   
 
As previously indicated, supra Section I.B.4.a, PB‟s 
capital contributions were, pursuant to the AREA, supposed 
to be used to pay down the Acquisition Loan.  Although that 
did occur, any decrease in the balance of the Acquisition 
Loan was then offset by a corresponding increase in the 
amount of the Construction Loan.  As the Tax Court 
explained: 
 
Shortly [after PB‟s capital contributions were 
used to pay down the principal on the 
Acquisition Loan], a corresponding draw would 
be made on the [C]onstruction [Loan], and 
NJSEA would advance those funds to [HBH].  
Ultimately, these offsetting draws left [HBH] 
with cash in the amount of [PB‟s] capital 
contributions, a decreased balance on the 
[A]cquisition [L]oan, and an increased balance 
on the [C]onstruction [L]oan.  These funds were 
then used by [HBH] to pay assorted fees related 
to the transaction and to pay NJSEA a 
developer‟s fee for its work managing and 
overseeing the East Hall‟s rehabilitation. 
 
(Id. at 17-18.)  Also as discussed above, supra Section 
I.B.4.c, the parties set the upper limit of the Construction 
Loan approximately $19.3 million higher than the anticipated 
amount of the total remaining construction costs as of the 
closing date, which would allow HBH to use PB‟s 
approximately $19.3 million in contributions to pay NJSEA a 
development fee and expenses related to the transaction 
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without being concerned that it would exceed the maximum 
limit on the Construction Loan provided by NJSEA. 
 
 PB made its second capital contribution in two 
installments, a $3,660,765 payment in December 2000, and a 
$3,400,000 payment the following month.  Once those 
contributions were received by NJSEA and used to pay down 
the principal on the Acquisition Loan, NJSEA, instead of 
using the entire capital contribution to fund a corresponding 
draw by HBH on the Construction Loan, used $3,332,500 of 
that amount to purchase the required Guaranteed Investment 
Contract as security for its potential obligation or opportunity 
to purchase PB‟s interest in HBH.30      
 
HBH experienced a net operating loss
31
 for both 
2000
32
 ($990,013) and 2001 ($3,766,639), even though 
                                              
30
 As noted, supra Section 1.B.4.a, the AREA required 
that NJSEA purchase the Guaranteed Investment Contract in 
the amount required to secure the purchase price to be paid by 
NJSEA if it exercised its Call Option.  However, pursuant to a 
pledge and escrow agreement entered into by NJSEA, PB, 
and an escrow agent in January 2001, NJSEA also pledged its 
interest in the Guaranteed Investment Contract as security for 
its potential purchase obligation in the event that PB 
exercised its Put Option, subject to NJSEA‟s right to apply 
the proceeds of that contract toward payment of the purchase 
price if it exercised its Call Option or Consent Option, or if 
PB exercised its Material Default Option.   
31
 We use the terms “net operating income” or “net 
operating loss” to mean the net income or loss before interest 
and depreciation expenses. 
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projections had indicated that HBH would generate net 
operating income of $500,000 in 2001.
33
  For the tax years 
ending in 2000 and 2001, HBH reported approximately 
$107.7 million in QREs, about $10.75 million more QREs 
than contemplated in the financial projections attached to the 
AREA.
34
  See supra note 25.  As a result, PB‟s required 
                                                                                                     
32
 HBH‟s statement of operations for 2000 covered the 
period June 26, 2000 (date of inception) through December 
31, 2000.   
33
 HBH‟s accountants did not make financial 
projections for operating revenues and expenses prior to 
2001. 
34
 It was possible for HBH to claim QREs that were 
incurred prior to its purported acquisition of the East Hall.  
See Treas. Reg. § 1.48-12(c)(3)(ii) (“Where [QREs] are 
incurred with respect to a building by a persons (or persons) 
other than the taxpayer [i.e. NJSEA] and the taxpayer [i.e. 
HBH] subsequently acquires the building, … the taxpayer 
acquiring the property shall be treated as having incurred the 
[QREs] actually incurred by the transferor …, provided that 
… [t]he building … acquired by the taxpayer was … not 
placed in service … after the [QREs] were incurred and prior 
to the date of acquisition, and … [n]o credit with respect to 
such [QREs] is claimed by anyone other than the taxpayer 
acquiring the property.” ).  Additionally, even if  “total 
construction costs” were only approximately $90.6 million as 
projected, it would also have been possible to generate over 
$107 million in QREs.  See id. § 1.48-12(c)(2) (noting that 
QREs could include, among other things, “development 
fees,” “legal expenses,” and certain “[c]onstruction period 
interest” expenses).  In any event, as discussed infra, the IRS 
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aggregate capital contribution was increased by 
approximately $2 million to $20,198,460 and the Investor 
Loan was increased by $118,000 to $1,218,000.
35
   
 
b) Post-Construction Phase 
  
According to NJSEA‟s 2001 annual report, the “$90 million 
renovation”36 of East Hall “was completed on time and on 
budget” and reopened “in October 2001.”  (Id. at 1757, 1758.)  
Approximately a year later, PB made its third – and largest – 
capital contribution of $10,467,849.  Around the time that 
contribution was made, Reznick prepared revised financial 
projections.  Whereas, at closing, Reznick had forecasted 
$1,715,867 of net operating income for 2002, the accountants 
                                                                                                     
has not challenged the amount of the QREs reported by HBH, 
but rather the allocation of any HBH partnership items to PB. 
35
 As contemplated by the LOI, see supra note 15, the 
AREA provided that “if the 2000 or 2001 Tax Credits which 
[HBH] will be entitled to claim with respect to such 
rehabilitation are greater than the Projected Tax Credits … 
the aggregate amount of [PB‟s] Capital Contribution shall be 
increased by $.995 for each $.999 by which the Tax Credits 
exceed the Projected Tax Credits.”  (J.A. at 178.)  It is unclear 
from the record why a portion of the required increase in 
capital contributions was instead applied to increase the 
Investor Loan. 
36
 The “$90 million” figure is at odds with the 
statement in the Confidential Memorandum that the 
renovation project would cost $107 million.  The difference 
approximates the sum eventually invested by PB.  See supra 
Section I.B.3.c. 
 42 
 
now projected a net operating loss of $3,976,023.  Ultimately, 
after reality finished with the pretense of profitability, HBH‟s 
net operating loss for 2002 was $4,280,527.  Notwithstanding 
the discrepancy between the initial and actual budgets for 
2002, Reznick did not alter projections for 2003 and future 
years.  For years 2003 through 2007,
37
 Reznick projected an 
aggregate net operating income of approximately $9.9 
million.  HBH actually experienced an aggregate net 
operating loss of over $10.5 million for those five years.  In 
early 2004, PB made a portion of its fourth and final capital 
contribution, paying $1,173,182 of its commitment of 
$2,019,846.
38
   
 
 When Reznick was preparing HBH‟s 2003 audited 
financial statements, it “addressed a possible impairment 
issue under FASB 144.”39  (Id. at 1638.)  FASB 144 requires 
                                              
37
 The record does not contain audited financial 
statements for HBH beyond 2007. 
38
 After paying that portion of the fourth installment, 
PB had made $19,351,796 of its $20,198,460 required capital 
contribution.  The notes to HBH‟s 2007 audited financial 
statements indicate that the $846,664 balance, plus interest, 
was still due, and was being reserved pending the outcome of 
litigation with the IRS.  The Tax Court also said that a 
“portion of [PB‟s] fourth capital contribution … is currently 
being held in escrow.”  (J.A. at 17.) 
39
 FASB is an acronym for the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, an organization that establishes standards 
which are officially recognized as authoritative by the SEC 
for financial accounting and which govern the preparation of 
financial reports by nongovernmental entities.  The number 
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a write down of an impaired asset to its actual value 
“whenever events or changes in circumstances indicate that 
its carrying amount may not be recoverable,” such as when 
there is “[a] current-period operating or cash flow loss 
combined with a history of operating or cash flow losses or a 
projection or forecast that demonstrates continuing losses 
associated with the use of a long-lived asset.”  Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 144, Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, 9 (Aug. 2001), 
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas144.pdf) (hereinafter referred to 
as “FASB 144”).  In a memo to HBH‟s audit file, Reznick 
considered a write down of HBH‟s interest in the East Hall 
pursuant to FASB 144, “[d]ue to the fact that [HBH] has 
experienced substantial operating losses and has not 
generated any operating cash flow since its inception.”  (J.A. 
at 1638.)  In the end, however, Reznick was persuaded by the 
powers at HBH that HBH was never meant to function as a 
self-sustaining venture and that the State of New Jersey was 
going to make good on HBH‟s losses.  In deciding against a 
write down, Reznick explained: 
 
Per discussions with the client, it was 
determined that [HBH] was not structured to 
provide operating cash flow.  Instead, the 
managing member, [NJSEA], agreed to fund all 
operating deficits of [HBH] in order to preserve 
the [East Hall] as a facility to be used by the 
residents of the State of New Jersey.  [NJSEA] 
has the ability to fund the deficits as a result of 
                                                                                                     
“144” refers to the number assigned to the particular standard 
at issue here. 
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the luxury and other taxes provided by the 
hospitality and entertainment industry in the 
state. 
(Id.)  “Since there is no ceiling on the amount of funds to be 
provided [by NJSEA to HBH] under the [AREA],” Reznick 
concluded “there [was] no triggering event which require[d] 
[a write down] under FASB 144.”  (Id.)  That same discussion 
and conclusion were included in separate memos to HBH‟s 
audit files for 2004 and 2005.
40
  By the end of 2007, the 
operating deficit loan payable to NJSEA was in excess of $28 
million.   
 
6. The Tax Returns and IRS Audit 
 
On its 2000 Form 1065,
41
 HBH reported an ordinary 
taxable loss of $1,712,893, and $38,862,877 in QREs.
42
  On 
                                              
40
 The record does not contain Reznick‟s audit files for 
HBH beyond 2005. 
41
 As detailed earlier, supra note 1, since HBH was a 
duly formed New Jersey limited liability company, had two 
members by the end of its 2000 tax year, and did not elect to 
be treated as a corporation, it was classified as a partnership 
for tax purposes for the tax years at issue here.  See Treas. 
Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1).  Partnerships do not pay federal 
income taxes, but rather are required to file a Form 1065, 
which is an annual information return of the partnership.  A 
Form 1065 also generates a Schedule K-1 for each partner, 
which reports a partner‟s distributive share of tax items.  The 
individual partners then report their allocable shares of the tax 
items on their own federal income tax returns.  See I.R.C. 
§§ 701-04, 6031. 
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its 2001 Form 1065, HBH reported an ordinary taxable loss of 
$6,605,142 and $68,865,639 in QREs.  On its 2002 Form 
1065, HBH reported an ordinary taxable loss of $9,135,373 
and $1,271,482 of QREs.  In accordance with its membership 
interest in HBH, PB was issued a Schedule K-1 allocating 
99.9% of the QREs for each of those tax years (collectively 
referred to herein as the “Subject Years”).43  
 
Following an audit of the returns of the Subject Years, 
the IRS issued to HBH a notice of final partnership 
administrative adjustment (“FPAA”).  That FPAA determined 
that all separately stated partnership items reported by HBH 
on its returns for the Subject Years should be reallocated from 
PB to NJSEA.  The IRS made that adjustment on various 
alternative, but related, grounds, two of which are of 
particular importance on appeal: first, the IRS said that HBH 
should not be recognized as a partnership for federal income 
tax purposes because it was created for the express purpose of 
improperly passing along tax benefits to PB and should be 
treated as a sham transaction; and, second, it said that PB‟s 
claimed partnership interest in HBH was not, based on the 
                                                                                                     
42
 HBH‟s 2000 Form 1065 stated that it began business 
on June 26, 2000. 
43
 While PB was also allocated 99.9% of the ordinary 
taxable loss for both 2001 and 2002, it appears it was only 
allocated approximately 69% of the ordinary taxable loss for 
2000.  Although it is unclear from the record, PB could have 
only been allocated 99.9% of the loss from the time it joined 
as a member in HBH in September 2000, although, as noted 
above, it was allocated 99.9% of the QREs for HBH‟s entire 
taxable year in 2000. 
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totality of the circumstances, a bona fide partnership 
participation because PB had no meaningful stake in the 
success or failure of HBH.
44
  The IRS also determined that 
accuracy-related penalties applied.   
 
C. The Tax Court Decision 
 
NJSEA, in its capacity as the tax matters partner of 
HBH,
45
 filed a timely petition to the United States Tax Court 
                                              
44
 The FPAA provided two additional grounds for 
reallocating partnership items  from PB to NJSEA.  It 
determined that no sale of the East Hall occurred between 
NJSEA and HBH for federal income tax purposes because the 
burdens and benefits of ownership of the East Hall interest 
did not pass from NJSEA, as the seller, to HBH, as the 
purchaser.  Although the IRS has appealed the Tax Court‟s 
rejection of that argument, see infra note 47, we will not 
address that contention in view of our ultimate disposition.  
The FPAA also determined that HBH should be disregarded 
for federal income tax purposes under the anti-abuse 
provisions of Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b).  The Tax Court also 
rejected that determination, and the IRS has not appealed that 
aspect of the decision.  
45
 A partnership such as HBH “designates a tax matters 
partner to handle tax questions on behalf of the partnership,” 
and that “partner is empowered to settle tax disputes on 
behalf of the partnership.”  Mathia v. Comm’r, 669 F.3d 
1080, 1082 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 47 
 
in response to the FPAA.
46
 Following a four-day trial in April 
2009, the Tax Court issued an opinion in favor of HBH.   
 
The Tax Court first rejected the Commissioner‟s 
argument that HBH is a sham under the economic substance 
doctrine.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  As the 
Court saw it, “all of [the IRS‟s] arguments concerning the 
economic substance of [HBH] [were] made without taking 
into account the 3-percent return and the [HRTCs].”  (Id. at 
37.)  The Court disagreed with the IRS‟s assertion that “[PB] 
invested in the [HBH] transaction solely to earn [HRTCs].”  
(Id. at 41.)  Instead, the Court “believe[d] that the 3-percent 
return and the expected tax credits should be viewed 
together,” and “[v]iewed as a whole, the [HBH] and the East 
Hall transactions did have economic substance” because the 
parties “had a legitimate business purpose – to allow [PB] to 
                                              
46
 “Upon receiving an FPAA, a partnership, via its tax 
matters partner, may file a petition in the Tax Court … .  
Once an FPAA is sent, the IRS cannot make any assessments 
attributable to relevant partnership items during the time the 
partnership seeks review … .”  Mathia, 669 F.3d at 1082.  
Once that petition is filed, a partnership-level administrative 
proceeding is commenced, governed by the Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.  Under that Act, all 
partnership items are determined in a single-level proceeding 
at the partnership level, which is binding on the partners and 
may not be challenged in a subsequent partner-level 
proceeding.  See I.R.C. §§ 6230(c)(4), 7422(h).  This 
streamlined process “remove[s] the substantial administrative 
burden occasioned by duplicative audits and litigation and … 
provide[s] consistent treatment of partnership tax items 
among partners in the same partnership.”  (J.A. at 31-32.) 
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invest in the East Hall‟s rehabilitation.”  (Id.)  In support of 
that determination, the Tax Court explained:  
 
Most of [PB‟s] capital contributions were used 
to pay a development fee to NJSEA for its role 
in managing the rehabilitation of the East Hall 
according to the development agreement 
between [HBH] and NJSEA. [The 
Commissioner‟s] contention that [PB] was 
unnecessary to the transaction because NJSEA 
was going to rehabilitate the East Hall without a 
corporate investor overlooks the impact that 
[PB] had on the rehabilitation: no matter 
NJSEA‟s intentions at the time it decided to 
rehabilitate the East Hall, [PB‟s] investment 
provided NJSEA with more money than it 
otherwise would have had; as a result, the 
rehabilitation ultimately cost the State of New 
Jersey less.  [The Commissioner] does not 
allege that a circular flow of funds resulted in 
[PB] receiving its 3–percent preferred return on 
its capital contributions. In addition, [PB] 
received the rehabilitation tax credits. 
(Id. at 41-42.)   
 
The Tax Court further explained that “[PB] faced risks 
as a result of joining [HBH].  First … it faced the risk that the 
rehabilitation would not be completed,” and additionally, 
“both NJSEA and [PB] faced potential liability for 
environmental hazards from the rehabilitation.”  (Id. at 43.)  
While recognizing that HBH and PB were insured parties 
under NJSEA‟s existing environmental insurance policy, the 
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Tax Court noted that “there was no guaranty that: (1) The 
insurance payout would cover any potential liability; and (2) 
if NJSEA was required to make up any difference, it would 
be financially able to do so.”  (Id. at 43-44.)  In sum, because 
“NJSEA had more money for the rehabilitation than it would 
have had if [PB] had not invested in [HBH],” and “[b]oth 
parties would receive a net economic benefit from the 
transaction if the rehabilitation was successful,” the Tax 
Court concluded that HBH had “objective economic 
substance.”  (Id. at 46-47.) 
 
The Tax Court used similar reasoning to reject the 
Commissioner‟s assertion that PB was not a bona fide partner 
in HBH.  Specifically, the Court rejected the Commissioner‟s 
contentions that “(1) [PB] had no meaningful stake in 
[HBH‟s] success or failure; and (2) [PB‟s] interest in [HBH] 
is more like debt than equity.”  (Id. at 47.)  After citing to the 
totality-of-the-circumstances partnership test laid out in 
Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949), the Court 
determined that “[PB] and NJSEA, in good faith and acting 
with a business purpose, intended to join together in the 
present conduct of a business enterprise” (J.A. at 49).  After 
“[t]aking into account the stated purpose behind [HBH‟s] 
formation, the parties‟ investigation of the transaction, the 
transaction documents, and the parties‟ respective roles,” the 
Tax Court held “that [HBH] was a valid partnership.”  (Id. at 
52.) 
 
Regarding the formation of a partnership, the Court 
said that, because “[PB] and NJSEA joined together in a 
transaction with economic substance to allow [PB] to invest 
in the East Hall rehabilitation,” and “the decision to invest 
provided a net economic benefit to [PB] through its 3-percent 
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preferred return and rehabilitation tax credits,” it was “clear 
that [PB] was a partner in [HBH].”  (Id. at 49-50.)  The Court 
opined that, since the East Hall operated at a loss, even if one 
were to “ignore the [HRTCs], [PB‟s] interest is not more like 
debt than equity because [PB] [was] not guaranteed to receive 
a 3-percent return every year … [as] there might not be 
sufficient cashflow to pay it.”  (Id. at 51.)   
 
The Tax Court also placed significant emphasis on 
“the parties‟ investigation and documentation” to “support 
[its] finding that the parties intended to join together in a 
rehabilitation of the East Hall.”  (Id. at 50.)  According to the 
Court, the Confidential Memorandum “accurately described 
the substance of the transaction: an investment in the East 
Hall‟s rehabilitation.”  (Id.)  The Court then cited to the 
parties‟ investigation into mitigating potential environmental 
hazards, as well as the parties‟ receipt of “a number of 
opinion letters evaluating various aspects of the transaction, 
to “support[] [its] finding of an effort to join together in the 
rehabilitation of the East Hall.”  (Id.)  The Court decided that 
“[t]he executed transaction documents accurately 
represent[ed] the substance of the transaction … to 
rehabilitate and manage the East Hall.”  (Id.)   Also, the Court 
found it noteworthy that “the parties … carried out their 
responsibilities under the AREA[:]  NJSEA oversaw the East 
Hall‟s rehabilitation, and [PB] made its required capital 
contributions.”47  (Id. at 51.) 
                                              
47
 Rejecting a third alternative ground brought by the 
IRS, see supra note 44, the Tax Court determined that NJSEA 
had transferred the benefits and burdens of its interest in the 
East Hall to render HBH the owner of the East Hall for tax 
purposes, see supra note 24.  To support that conclusion, the 
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Hence, the Tax Court entered a decision in favor of 
HBH.  This timely appeal by the Commissioner followed.  
 
II. Discussion48 
 
The Commissioner
49
 alleges that the Tax Court erred 
by allowing PB, through its membership interest in HBH, to 
receive the HRTCs generated by the East Hall renovation.  He 
characterizes the transaction as an impermissible “indirect 
sale of the [HRTCs] to a taxable entity. … by means of a 
purported partnership between the seller of the credits, 
[NJSEA], and the purchaser, [PB].”  (Appellant‟s Opening 
Br. at 30.)  While the Commissioner raises several arguments 
                                                                                                     
Court observed that (1) “[t]he parties treated the transaction 
as a sale”; (2) “possession of the East Hall vested in [HBH]”; 
(3) “[HBH] reported the East Hall‟s profits and stood to lose 
its income if the East Hall stopped operating as an event 
space”; and (4) “[b]ank accounts were opened in [HBH‟s] 
name by [Spectacor] as operator of the East Hall.” (J.A. at 54-
55.)  Because of our ultimate resolution, we will not 
specifically address the Tax Court‟s analysis of that 
contention. 
48
 The Tax Court had jurisdiction pursuant to I.R.C. 
§§ 6226(f) and 7442, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 
I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1).  We exercise de novo review over the 
Tax Court‟s ultimate characterization of a transaction, and 
review its findings of fact for clear error.  Merck & Co., Inc. 
v. United States, 652 F.3d 475, 480-81 (3d Cir. 2011). 
49
 The current Commissioner of Internal Revenue is 
Douglas Shulman. 
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in his effort to reallocate the HRTCs from NJSEA to PB, we 
focus primarily on his contention that PB should not be 
treated as a bona fide partner in HBH because PB did not 
have a meaningful stake in the success or failure of the 
partnership.
50
  We agree that PB was not a bona fide partner 
in HBH. 
                                              
50
 The Commissioner also contends that HBH was a 
sham.  Specifically, the Commissioner invokes a “sham-
partnership theory,” which he says is “a variant of the 
economic-substance (sham-transaction) doctrine.”  
(Appellant‟s Opening Br. at 50.)  That theory, according to 
the Commissioner “focus[es] on (1) whether the formation of 
the partnership made sense from an economic standpoint, as 
would be the case [under the Culbertson inquiry], and (2) 
whether there was otherwise a legitimate business purpose for 
the use of the partnership form.”  (Id.)   
HBH contends that the IRS‟s sham-partnership theory, 
which HBH asserts is “merely a rehash of the factual claims 
that [the IRS] made in challenging [PB‟s] status as a partner 
in HBH,” is distinct from the sham-transaction doctrine (also 
known as the economic substance doctrine) that was litigated 
before the Tax Court.  Amicus Real Estate Roundtable (the 
“Roundtable”) agrees, submitting that the Commissioner‟s 
sham-partnership argument “inappropriately blur[s] the line 
between the [economic substance doctrine] and the 
[substance-over-form doctrine],” the latter of which applies 
when the form of a transaction is not the same as its economic 
reality.  (Roundtable Br. at 7.)  The point is well-taken, as the 
economic substance doctrine and the substance-over-form 
doctrine certainly “are distinct.”  Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. 
Comm’r, 299 F.3d 221, 230 n.12 (3d Cir. 2002); see generally 
Rogers v. United States, 281 F.3d 1108, 1115-17 (10th Cir. 
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2002) (noting differences between the substance-over-form 
doctrine and the economic substance doctrine).  The 
substance-over-form doctrine “is applicable to instances 
where the „substance‟ of a particular transaction produces tax 
results inconsistent with the „form‟ embodied in the 
underlying documentation, permitting a court to 
recharacterize the transaction in accordance with its 
substance.”  Neonatology Assocs., 299 F.3d at 230 n.12.  On 
the other hand, the economic substance doctrine “applies 
where the economic or business purpose of a transaction is 
relatively insignificant in relation to the comparatively large 
tax benefits that accrue.”  Id.   
As the Roundtable correctly explains, “[t]he fact that 
[a] taxpayer might not be viewed as a partner (under the 
[substance-over-form doctrine]) or that the transaction should 
be characterized as a sale (again, under the [substance-over-
form doctrine]) [does] not mean that the underlying 
transaction violated the [economic substance doctrine].”  
(Roundtable Br. at 7.)  Put another way, even if a transaction 
has economic substance, the tax treatment of those engaged in 
the transaction is still subject to a substance-over-form 
inquiry to determine whether a party was a bona fide partner 
in the business engaged in the transaction.  See Southgate 
Master Fund, L.L.C. ex rel. Montgomery Capital Advisors, 
LLC v. United States, 659 F.3d 466, 484 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(“The fact that a partnership‟s underlying business activities 
had economic substance does not, standing alone, immunize 
the partnership from judicial scrutiny [under Culbertson].”); 
id. (“If there was not a legitimate, profit-motivated reason to 
operate as a partnership, then the partnership will be 
disregarded for tax purposes even if it engaged in transactions 
that had economic substance.”).   
 54 
 
A. The Test 
 
A partnership exists when, as the Supreme Court said 
in Commissioner v. Culbertson, two or more “parties in good 
faith and acting with a business purpose intend[] to join 
together in the present conduct of the enterprise.”  337 U.S. at 
742; see also Comm’r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1946) 
(“When the existence of an alleged partnership arrangement 
is challenged by outsiders, the question arises whether the 
partners really and truly intended to join together for the 
purpose of carrying on business and sharing in the profits or 
losses or both.”); Southgate Master Fund, L.L.C. ex rel. 
Montgomery Capital Advisors v. United States, 659 F.3d 466, 
488 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The sine qua non of a partnership is an 
intent to join together for the purpose of sharing in the profits 
and losses of a genuine business.”). 
 
                                                                                                     
At oral argument, the IRS conceded that this case 
“lends itself more cleanly to the bona fide partner theory,” 
under which we look to the substance of the putative partner‟s 
interest over its form.  Oral Argument at 11:00, Historic 
Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. Comm’r (No. 11-1832), available at 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/11-
1832Historic%20Boardwalk%20LLC%20v%20Commissione
r%20IRS.wma. Accordingly, we focus our analysis on 
whether PB is as a bona fide partner in HBH, and in doing so, 
we assume, without deciding, that this transaction had 
economic substance.  Specifically, we do not opine on the 
parties‟ dispute as to whether, under Sacks v. Commissioner, 
69 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 1995), we can consider the HRTCs in 
evaluating whether a transaction has economic substance. 
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The Culbertson test is used to analyze the bona fides 
of a partnership and to decide whether a party‟s “interest was 
a bona fide equity partnership participation.”  TIFD III-E, Inc. 
v. United States, 459 F.3d 220, 232 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(hereinafter “Castle Harbour ”).  To determine, under 
Culbertson, whether PB was a bona fide partner in HBH, we 
must consider the totality of the circumstances, 
 
considering all the facts – the agreement, the 
conduct of the parties in execution of its 
provisions, their statements, the testimony of 
disinterested persons, the relationship of the 
parties, their respective abilities and capital 
contributions, the actual control of income and 
the purposes for which it is used, and any other 
facts throwing light on their true intent. 
337 U.S. at 742.  That “test turns on the fair, objective 
characterization of the interest in question upon consideration 
of all the circumstances.”  Castle Harbour, 459 F.2d at 232.   
 
The Culbertson test “illustrat[es] … the principle that a 
transaction must be judged by its substance, rather than its 
form, for income tax purposes.”  Trousdale v. Comm’r, 219 
F.2d 563, 568 (9th Cir. 1955).  Even if there are “indicia of an 
equity participation in a partnership,” Castle Harbour, 459 
F.3d at 231, we should not “accept[] at face value artificial 
constructs of the partnership agreement,” id. at 232.  Rather, 
we must examine those indicia to determine whether they 
truly reflect an intent to share in the profits or losses of an 
enterprise or, instead, are “either illusory of insignificant.”  
Id. at 231.  In essence, to be a bona fide partner for tax 
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purposes, a party must have a “meaningful stake in the 
success or failure” of the enterprise.  Id.   
 
B. The Commissioner’s Guideposts 
 
The Commissioner points us to two cases he calls 
“recent guideposts” bearing on the bona fide equity partner 
inquiry.  (Appellant‟s Opening Br. at 34.)  First, he cites to 
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in Castle Harbour, 459 F.3d 220.  The Castle 
Harbour court relied on Culbertson in disregarding the 
claimed partnership status of two foreign banks.  Those banks 
had allegedly formed a partnership, known as Castle Harbour, 
LLC, with TIFD III-E, Inc. (“TIFD”), a subsidiary of General 
Electric Capital Corporation, with an intent to allocate certain 
income away from TIFD, an entity subject to United States 
income taxes, to the two foreign banks, which were not 
subject to such taxes.  Id. at 223.  Relying on the sham-
transaction doctrine, the district court had rejected the IRS‟s 
contention that the foreign banks‟ interest was not a bona fide 
equity partnership participation “because, in addition to the 
strong and obvious tax motivations, the [partnership] had 
some additional non-tax motivation to raise equity capital.”  
Id. at 231.  In reversing the district court, the Second Circuit 
stated that it “[did] not mean to imply that it was error to 
consider the sham test, as the IRS purported to rely in part on 
that test.  The error was in failing to test the banks‟ interest 
also under Culbertson after finding that the [partnership‟s] 
characterization survived the sham test.”  Id.  The Second 
Circuit focused primarily on the Culbertson inquiry, and 
specifically on the IRS‟s contention that the foreign banks 
“should not be treated as equity partners in the Castle 
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Harbour partnership because they had no meaningful stake in 
the success or failure of the partnership.”  Id. at 224.     
 
Applying the bona fide partner theory as embodied in 
Culbertson‟s totality-of-the-circumstances test, the Castle 
Harbour court held that the banks‟ purported partnership 
interest was, in substance, “overwhelmingly in the nature of a 
secured lender‟s interest, which would neither be harmed by 
poor performance of the partnership nor significantly 
enhanced by extraordinary profits.”  Id. at 231.  Although it 
acknowledged that the banks‟ interest “was not totally devoid 
of indicia of an equity participation in a partnership,” the 
Court said that those indicia “were either illusory or 
insignificant in the overall context of the banks‟ investment,” 
and, thus, “[t]he IRS appropriately rejected the equity 
characterization.”  Id.    
 
The Castle Harbour court observed that “consider[ing] 
whether an interest has the prevailing character of debt or 
equity can be helpful in analyzing whether, for tax purposes, 
the interest should be deemed a bona fide equity 
participation.”  Id. at 232.  In differentiating between debt and 
equity, it counseled that “the significant factor … [is] whether 
the funds were advanced with reasonable expectation of 
repayment regardless of the success of the venture or were 
placed at the risk of the business.”  Id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Thus, in determining whether the 
banks‟ interest was a bona fide equity participation, the 
Second Circuit focused both on the banks‟ lack of downside 
risk and lack of upside potential in the partnership.  It agreed 
with the “district court[‟s] recogni[tion] that the banks ran no 
meaningful risk of being paid anything less than the 
reimbursement of their investment at the [agreed-upon rate] 
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of return.”  Id. at 233.  In support of that finding, the Court 
noted that: 
 
[TIFD] was required … to keep … high-grade 
commercial paper or cash, in an amount equal 
to 110% of the current value of the [amount that 
the banks would receive upon dissolution of the 
partnership.]  The partnership, in addition, was 
obliged for the banks‟ protection to maintain 
$300 million worth of casualty-loss insurance.  
Finally, and most importantly, [General Electric 
Capital Corporation] – a large and very stable 
corporation – gave the banks its personal 
guaranty, which effectively secured the 
partnership‟s obligations to the banks. 
Id. at 228.   
 
Regarding upside potential, however, the Second 
Circuit disagreed with the district court‟s conclusion that the 
banks had a “meaningful and unlimited share of the upside 
potential.”  Id. at 233.  That conclusion could not be credited 
because it “depended on the fictions projected by the 
partnership agreement, rather than on assessment of the 
practical realities.”  Id. at 234.  Indeed, the Second Circuit 
stated that “[t]he realistic possibility of upside potential – not 
the absence of formal caps – is what governs this analysis.”  
Id.  In reality, “the banks enjoyed only a narrowly 
circumscribed ability to participate in profits in excess of” the 
repayment of its investment, id., because TIFD had the power 
to either effectively restrict the banks‟ share of profits at 1% 
above an agreed-upon return of $2.85 million, or to buy out 
their interest at any time at a “negligible cost” of 
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approximately $150,000, id. at 226, 235.  The return on the 
banks‟ initial investment of $117.5 million was thus limited 
to $2.85 million plus 1% – “a relatively insignificant 
incremental return over the projected eight-year life of the 
partnership,” id. at 235.  In sum, “look[ing] not so much at 
the labels used by the partnership but at true facts and 
circumstances,” as Culbertson directs, the Castle Harbour 
court was “compel[led] [to] conclu[de] that the … banks‟ 
interest was, for tax purposes, not a bona fide equity 
participation.”  Id. at 241.   
 
The second, more recent, precedent that the 
Commissioner directs us to as a “guidepost” is Virginia 
Historic Tax Credit Fund 2001 LP v. Commissioner, 639 F.3d 
129 (4th Cir. 2011) (hereinafter “Virginia Historic”).  There, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held 
that certain transactions between a partnership and its partners 
which sought to qualify for tax credits under the 
Commonwealth of Virginia‟s Historic Rehabilitation Credit 
Program (the “Virginia Program”)51 were, in substance, sales 
of those credits which resulted in taxable income to the 
partnership.  Id. at 132.  In Virginia Historic, certain 
investment funds (the “Funds”) were structured “as 
                                              
51
 The Virginia Program, much like the federal HRTC 
statute, was enacted to encourage investment in renovating 
historic properties.  Virginia Historic, 639 F.3d at 132.  
Similar to federal HRTCs, the credits under the Virginia 
Program could be applied to reduce a taxpayer‟s Virginia 
income tax liability, dollar-for-dollar, up to 25% of eligible 
expenses incurred in rehabilitating the property.  Id.  Also like 
federal HRTCs, credits under the Virginia program could not 
be sold or transferred to another party.  Id. at 132-33. 
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partnerships that investors could join by contributing capital.”  
Id. at 133.  Through four linked partnership entities with one 
“source partnership” entity (the “Source Partnership”), “[t]he 
Funds would use [the] capital [provided by investors] to 
partner with historic property developers [“Operating 
Partnerships”] renovating smaller projects, in exchange for 
state tax credits.”  Id.  The confidential offering memorandum 
given to potential investors provided that, “[f]or every $.74-
$.80 contributed by an investor, [one of the] Fund[s] would 
provide the investor with $1 in tax credits.  If such credits 
could not be obtained, the partnership agreement promised a 
refund of capital to the investor, net of expenses.”  Id. at 134 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Additionally, 
“the partnership agreement stated that the Funds would invest 
only in completed projects, thereby eliminating a significant 
area of risk” to the investors.  Id.  “[T]he Funds reported the 
money paid to Operating Partnerships in exchange for tax 
credits as partnership expenses and reported the investors‟ 
contributions to the Funds as nontaxable contributions to 
capital.”  Id. at 135. 
 
The IRS “challenged [the Funds‟] characterization of 
investors‟ funding as „contributions to capital‟” because the 
IRS believed that the investors were, in substance, purchasers 
of state income tax credits, and thus the money that the Funds 
received from the investors should have been reported as 
taxable income.  Id.  At trial, the Commissioner supported his 
position with two theories.  First, he relied on the substance-
over-form doctrine, saying that the investors were not bona 
fide partners in the Funds but were instead purchasers; and, 
second, he said that the transactions between the investors 
and the partnerships were “disguised sales” under I.R.C. 
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§ 707.
52
  Id. at 136.  The Tax Court rejected both of those 
assertions, and found that the investors were partners in the 
Funds for federal tax purposes.  Id. at 136-37. 
 
The Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax Court.  
“Assuming, without deciding, that a „bona fide‟ partnership 
existed,” the Virginia Historic court found that “the 
Commissioner properly characterized the transactions at issue 
as „sales‟” under the disguised-sale rules.  Id. at 137.  The 
Fourth Circuit first turned to the regulations that provide 
guidance in determining whether a disguised sale has 
occurred.  See id. at 137-39 (citing to, inter alia, Treas. Reg. 
§§ 1.707-3, 1.707-6(a)).  Specifically, it explained that a 
transaction should be reclassified as a sale if, based on all the 
facts and circumstances, (1) a partner would not have 
transferred money to the partnership but for the transfer of 
property – the receipt of tax credits – to the partner; and (2) 
                                              
52
 Under I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(A), 
[i]f (i) a partner performs services for a 
partnership or transfers property to a 
partnership, (ii) there is a related direct or 
indirect allocation and distribution to such 
partner, and (iii) the performance of such 
services (or such transfer) and the allocation 
and distribution, when viewed together, are 
properly characterized as a transaction 
occurring between the partnership and a partner 
acting other than in his capacity as a member of 
the partnership, such allocation and distribution 
shall be treated as a transaction [between the 
partnership and one who is not a partner]. 
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the latter transfer – the receipt of tax credits – “is not 
dependent on the entrepreneurial risks of partnership 
operations.”  Id. at 145 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3(b)(1)).  
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the risks cited by the Tax 
Court – such as the “risk that developers would not complete 
their projects on time because of construction, zoning, or 
management issues,” “risk … [of] liability for improper 
construction,” and “risk of mismanagement or fraud at the 
developer partnership level” – “appear[ed] both speculative 
and circumscribed.”  Id.  While the Fourth Circuit 
acknowledged that “there was … no guarantee that resources 
would remain available in the source partnership to make the 
promised refunds,” it determined “that the Funds were 
structured in such a way as to render the possibility of 
insolvency remote.”  Id. 
 
In holding “that there was no true entrepreneurial risk 
faced by investors” in the transactions at issue, the Virginia 
Historic court pointed to several different factors: 
 
First, investors were promised what was, in 
essence, a fixed rate of return on investment 
rather than any share in partnership profits tied 
to their partnership interests. … Second, the 
Funds assigned each investor an approximate 
.01% partnership interest and explicitly told 
investors to expect no allocations of material 
amounts of … partnership items of income, 
gain, loss or deduction.  Third, investors were 
secured against losing their contributions by the 
promise of a refund from the Funds if tax 
credits could not be delivered or were revoked.  
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And fourth, the Funds hedged against the 
possibility of insolvency by promising investors 
that contributions would be made only to 
completed projects and by requiring the 
Operating Partnerships to promise refunds, in 
some cases backed by guarantors, if promised 
credits could not be delivered. 
Id.  (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  In sum, 
the Fourth Circuit deemed “persuasive the Commissioner‟s 
contention that the only risk … was that faced by any advance 
purchaser who pays for an item with a promise of later 
delivery.  It [was] not the risk of the entrepreneur who puts 
money into a venture with the hope that it might grow in 
amount but with the knowledge that it may well shrink.” Id. at 
145-46 (citing Tower, 327 U.S. at 287; Staff of J. Comm. on 
Tax‟n, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of the 
Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, at 
226 (“To the extent that a partner‟s profit from a transaction 
is assured without regard to the success or failure of the joint 
undertaking, there is not the requisite joint profit motive.” 
(alteration in original))).  Accordingly, it agreed with the 
Commissioner that the Funds should have reported the money 
received from the investors as taxable income.  Id. at 146. 
 
 
The Fourth Circuit concluded its opinion with an 
important note regarding its awareness of the legislative 
policy of providing tax credits to spur private investment in 
historic rehabilitation projects: 
 
We reach this conclusion mindful of the 
fact that it is “the policy of the Federal 
Government” to “assist State and local 
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governments … to expand and accelerate their 
historic preservation programs and activities.” 
16 U.S.C. § 470-1(6).  And we find no fault in 
the Tax Court‟s conclusion that both the Funds 
and the Funds‟ investors engaged in the 
challenged transactions with the partial goal of 
aiding Virginia‟s historic rehabilitation efforts.  
But Virginia‟s Historic Rehabilitation Program 
is not under attack here. 
Id. at 146 n.20. 
 
C. Application of the Guideposts to HBH 
 
 The Commissioner asserts that Castle Harbour and 
Virginia Historic “provide a highly pertinent frame of 
reference for analyzing the instant case.”  (Appellant‟s 
Opening Br. at 40.)  According to the Commissioner, “[m]any 
of the same factors upon which the [Castle Harbour court] 
relied in finding that the purported bank partners … were, in 
substance, lenders to the GE entity also support the 
conclusion that [PB] was, in substance, not a partner in HBH 
but, instead, was a purchaser of tax credits from HBH.”53  
(Id.)  That is so, says the Commissioner, because, as 
confirmed by the Virginia Historic court‟s reliance on the 
                                              
53
 The Commissioner acknowledges that “[a]lthough 
certain aspects of [PB‟s] cash investment in HBH were debt-
like (e.g., its 3-percent preferred return), this case does not fit 
neatly within the debt-equity dichotomy, since [PB] 
recovered its „principal,‟ i.e. its purported capital 
contributions to HBH, in the form of tax credits rather than 
cash.”  (Appellant‟s Opening Br. at 40 n.14.) 
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“entrepreneurial risks of partnership operations,” Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.707-3(b)(1), “the distinction between an equity 
contribution to a partnership … and a transfer of funds to a 
partnership as payment of the sales price of partnership 
property [, i.e., tax credits,]… is the same as the principal 
distinction between equity and debt” (Appellant‟s Opening 
Br. at 40-41).  The key point is that the “recovery of an equity 
investment in a partnership is dependent on the 
entrepreneurial risks of partnership operations, whereas 
recovery of a loan to a partnership – or receipt of an asset 
purchased from a partnership – is not.”  (Id. at 41.)  In other 
words, “an equity investor in a partnership (i.e., a bona fide 
partner) has a meaningful stake in the success or failure of the 
enterprise, whereas a lender to, or purchaser from, the 
partnership does not.”  (Id.)  In sum, the Commissioner 
argues that, just as the banks in Castle Harbour had no 
meaningful stake in their respective partnerships, and the 
“investors” in Virginia Historic were more like purchasers 
than participants in a business venture, “it is clear from the 
record in this case that [PB] had no meaningful stake in the 
success or failure of HBH.”  (Id.)   
 
In response, HBH asserts that “[t]here are a plethora of 
errors in the IRS‟s tortured effort … to apply Castle Harbour 
and Virginia Historic … to the facts of the present case.”  
(Appellee‟s Br. at 38.)  First, HBH argues that it is 
“abundantly apparent” that Castle Harbour “is completely 
inapposite” to it because the actual provisions in Castle 
Harbour‟s partnership agreement that minimized the banks‟ 
downside risk and upside potential were more limiting than 
the provisions in the AREA.  (Appellee‟s Br. at 35.)  HBH 
contends that, unlike the partnership agreement in Castle 
Harbour, “[PB] has no rights under the AREA to compel 
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HBH to repay all or any part of its capital contribution,” PB‟s 
3% Preferred Return was “not guaranteed,” and “NJSEA has 
no … right to divest [PB] of its interest in any income or 
gains from the East Hall.”  (Id.) 
 
As to Virginia Historic, HBH argues that it “has no 
application whatsoever” here.  (Id. at 38.)  It reasons that the 
decision in that case “assumed that valid partnerships existed 
as a necessary condition to applying I.R.C. § 707(b)‟s 
disguised sale rules” (id. at 36), and that the case was 
“analyzed … solely under the disguised sale regime” – which 
is not at issue in the FPAA sent to HBH (id. at 38).  
 
Overall, HBH characterizes Castle Harbour and 
Virginia Historic as “pure misdirections which lead to an 
analytical dead end” (id. at 32), and emphasizes that “[t]he 
question … Culbertson asks is simply whether the parties 
intended to conduct a business together and share in the 
profits and losses therefrom” (id. at 39).  We have no quarrel 
with how HBH frames the Culbertson inquiry.  But what 
HBH fails to recognize is that resolving whether a purported 
partner had a “meaningful stake in the success or failure of 
the partnership,” Castle Harbour, 459 F.3d at 224, goes to the 
core of the ultimate determination of whether the parties 
“„intended to join together in the present conduct of the 
enterprise,‟” id. at 232 (quoting Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 742).  
Castle Harbour‟s analysis that concluded that the banks‟ 
“indicia of an equity participation in a partnership” was only 
“illusory or insignificant,” id. at 231, and Virginia Historic‟s 
determination that the limited partner investors did not face 
the “entrepreneurial risks of partnership operations,” 639 F.3d 
at 145 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), are 
both highly relevant to the question of whether HBH was a 
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partnership in which PB had a true interest in profit and 
loss,
54
 and the answer to that question turns on an assessment 
                                              
54
 We reject, moreover, any suggestion that the 
disguised-sale rules and the bona fide-partner theory apply in 
mutually exclusive contexts.  Virginia Historic did not 
“assume[] that valid partnerships existed as a necessary 
condition” prior to applying the disguised-sale rules.  
(Appellee‟s Br. at 36.)  Rather, as the Virginia Historic court 
observed, “[t]he Department of the Treasury specifically 
contemplates that its regulations regarding disguised sales can 
be applied before it is determined whether a valid partnership 
exists.”  639 F.3d at 137 n.9 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3).   
More importantly, HBH simply ignores why many of 
the principles espoused in Virginia Historic are applicable 
here.  It is true that the challenged transaction here does not 
involve state tax credits and that the IRS has not invoked the 
disguised-sale rules, but distinguishing the case on those 
grounds fails to address the real issue.  Virginia Historic is 
telling because the disguised-sale analysis in that case 
“touches on the same risk-reward analysis that lies at the 
heart of the bona fide-partner determination.”  (Appellant‟s 
Reply Br. at 9.)  Under the disguised-sale regulations, a 
transfer of “property … by a partner to a partnership” and a 
“transfer of money or other consideration … by the 
partnership to the partner” will be classified as a disguised 
sale if, based on the facts and circumstances, “(i) [t]he 
transfer of money or other consideration would not have been 
made but for the transfer of property; and (ii) [i]n cases in 
which the transfers are not made simultaneously, the 
subsequent transfer is not dependent on the entrepreneurial 
risks of partnership operations.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3(b)(1). 
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Thus, the disguised-sale analysis includes an 
examination of “whether the benefit running from the 
partnership to the person allegedly acting in the capacity of a 
partner is „dependent upon the entrepreneurial risks of 
partnership operations.‟”  (Appellant‟s Reply Br. at 9 
(quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3(b)(1)(ii)).)  That 
entrepreneurial risk issue also arises in the bona fide-partner 
analysis, which focuses on whether the partner has a 
meaningful stake in the profits and losses of the enterprise.  
Moreover, many of the facts and circumstances laid out in the 
pertinent treasury regulations that “tend to prove the existence 
of a [disguised] sale,” Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3(b)(2), are also 
relevant to the bona fide-partner analysis here.  See, e.g., id. 
§ 1.707-3(b)(2)(i) (“That the timing and amount of a 
subsequent transfer [i.e., the HRTCs] are determinable with 
reasonable certainty at the time of an earlier transfer [i.e., 
PB‟s capital contributions];”); id. § 1.707-3(b)(2)(iii) (“That 
the partner‟s [i.e., PB‟s] right to receive the transfer of money 
or other consideration [i.e., the HRTCs] is secured in any 
manner, taking into account the period during which it is 
secured;”); id. § 1.707-3(b)(2)(iv) (“That any person [i.e., 
NJSEA] has made or is legally obligated to make 
contributions [e.g., the Tax Benefits Guaranty] to the 
partnership in order to permit the partnership to make the 
transfer of money or other consideration [i.e., the HRTCs];”); 
id. § 1.707-3(b)(2)(v) (“That any person [i.e., NJSEA] has 
loaned or has agreed to loan the partnership the money or 
other consideration [e.g., Completion Guaranty, Operating 
Deficit Guaranty] required to enable the partnership to make 
the transfer, taking into account whether any such lending 
obligation is subject to contingencies related to the results of 
partnership operations;”).  Although we are not suggesting 
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of risk participation.  We are persuaded by the 
Commissioner‟s argument that PB, like the purported bank 
partners in Castle Harbour, did not have any meaningful 
downside risk or any meaningful upside potential in HBH. 
 
1. Lack of Meaningful Downside Risk 
  
PB had no meaningful downside risk because it was, for all 
intents and purposes, certain to recoup the contributions it had 
made to HBH and to receive the primary benefit it sought– 
the HRTCs or their cash equivalent.  First, any risk that PB 
would not receive HRTCs in an amount that was at least 
equivalent to installments it had made to-date (i.e., the 
“Investment Risk”) was non-existent.  That is so because, 
under the AREA, PB was not required to make an installment 
contribution to HBH until NJSEA had verified that it had 
achieved a certain level of progress with the East Hall 
renovation that would generate enough cumulative HRTCs to 
at least equal the sum of the installment which was then to be 
contributed and all prior capital contributions that had been 
made by PB.  (See J.A. at 176, 242 (first installment of 
$650,000 due at closing was paid when NJSEA had already 
incurred over $53 million of QREs which would generate 
over $10 million in HRTCs); id. at 176-77 (second 
installment, projected to be $7,092,588, was not due until, 
among other events, a projection of the HRTCs for 2000 
(which were estimated at closing to be $7,789,284) based on 
                                                                                                     
that a disguised-sale determination and a bona fide-partner 
inquiry are interchangeable, the analysis pertinent to each 
look to whether the putative partner is subject to meaningful 
risks of partnership operations before that partner receives the 
benefits which may flow from that enterprise. 
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a “determination of the actual rehabilitation costs of [HBH] 
that qualify for Tax Credits in 2000”); id. at 177 (third 
installment, projected to be $8,523,630, was not due until the 
later of, among other events, (1) “evidence of Substantial 
Completion of Phase 4 … .”; and (2) a projection of the 
HRTCs for 2001 (which were estimated at closing to be 
$11,622,889) based on a “determination of the actual 
rehabilitation costs of [HBH] that qualify for Tax Credits in 
2001”); id. (fourth installment, projected to be $1,929,580, 
was not due until, among other events, PB received a “K-1 for 
2001 evidencing the actual Tax Credits for 2001,” a tax 
document that would not have been available until after the 
estimated completion date of the entire project).)  While PB 
did not have the contractual right to “compel HBH to repay 
all or any part of its capital contribution” (Appellee‟s Br. at 
35), PB had an even more secure deal.  Even before PB made 
an installment contribution, it knew it would receive at least 
that amount in return. 
 
  Second, once an installment contribution had been 
made, the Tax Benefits Guaranty eliminated any risk that, due 
to a successful IRS challenge in disallowing any HRTCs, PB 
would not receive at least the cash equivalent of the 
bargained-for tax credits (i.e., the “Audit Risk”).  The Tax 
Benefits Guaranty obligated NJSEA
55
 to pay PB not only the 
amount of tax credit disallowed, but also any penalties and 
interest, as well as up to $75,000 in legal and administrative 
expenses incurred in connection with such a challenge, and 
                                              
55
 Although HBH was the named obligor under the 
Tax Benefits Guaranty, the agreement provided that “NJSEA 
… shall fund any obligations of [HBH] to [PB]” under the 
Tax Benefits Guaranty.  (J.A. at 303.) 
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the amount necessary to pay any tax due on those 
reimbursements.  Cf. Virginia Historic, 639 F.3d at 145 
(noting the fact that “investors were secured against losing 
their contributions by the promise of a refund from the Funds 
if tax credits could not be delivered or were revoked” 
“point[ed] to the conclusion that there was no true 
entrepreneurial risk faced by investors”). 
 
Third, any risk that PB would not receive all of its 
bargained-for tax credits (or cash equivalent through the Tax 
Benefits Guaranty) due to a failure of any part of the 
rehabilitation to be successfully completed (i.e., the “Project 
Risk”) was also effectively eliminated because the project 
was already fully funded before PB entered into any 
agreement to provide contributions to HBH.  (See J.A. at 962 
(statement in the Confidential Memorandum that “[t]he 
rehabilitation is being funded entirely by [NJSEA]”); id. at 
1134 (notes from a NJSEA executive committee meeting in 
March 2000 indicating that “[t]he bulk of the Investor‟s 
equity is generally contributed to the company after the 
project is placed into service and the tax credit is earned, the 
balance when stabilization is achieved”); id. at 1714 (notes to 
NJSEA‟s 1999 annual report stating that the Casino 
Reinvestment Development Authority had “agreed to 
reimburse [NJSEA] [for] … all costs in excess of bond 
proceeds for the project”).)  That funding, moreover, included 
coverage for any excess development costs.
56
  In other words, 
                                              
56
 PB had no exposure to the risk of excess 
construction costs, as the Completion Guaranty in the AREA 
provided that NJSEA was obligated to pay all such costs.  
Additionally, even after the renovation was completed, PB 
need not worry about any operating deficits that HBH would 
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PB‟s contributions were not at all necessary for the East Hall 
project to be completed.  Cf. Virginia Historic, 639 F.3d at 
145 (noting that the fact that “the Funds hedged against the 
possibility of insolvency by promising investors that 
contributions would be made only to completed projects” 
“point[ed] to the conclusion that there was not true 
entrepreneurial risk faced by investors”).  Furthermore,  
HBH‟s own accountants came to the conclusion that the 
source of the project‟s funds – NJSEA (backed by the Casino 
Reinvestment Development Authority) – was more than 
capable of covering any excess development costs incurred 
by the project, as well as any operating deficits of HBH, and 
NJSEA had promised that coverage through the Completion 
Guaranty and the Operating Deficit Guaranty, respectively, in 
the AREA.  (See J.A. at 1638 (memo to audit file noting that, 
because “[NJSEA] has the ability to fund the [operating] 
deficits as a result of the luxury and other taxes provided by 
the hospitality and entertainment industry in the state,” and 
“there is no ceiling on the amount of funds to be provided [by 
NJSEA to HBH],” “no triggering event [had occurred] which 
require[d] [a write down] under FASB 144”).)  Cf. Virginia 
Historic, 639 F.3d at 145 (noting that although “[i]t [was] true 
… there was … no guarantee that resources would remain 
available in the source partnership to make the promised 
refunds … it [was] also true that the Funds were structured in 
such a way as to render the possibility of insolvency 
remote”).)  Thus, although the Tax Court determined that PB 
                                                                                                     
incur, as NJSEA promised to cover any such deficits through 
the Operating Deficit Guaranty.  Furthermore, as detailed 
infra note 58, PB ran no real risk of incurring any 
environmental liability in connection with the East Hall 
renovation. 
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“faced the risk that the rehabilitation would not be 
completed” (J.A. at 43), the record belies that conclusion.  
Because NJSEA had deep pockets, and, as succinctly stated 
by Reznick, “there [was] no ceiling on the amount of funds to 
be provided [by NJSEA to HBH]” (id. at 1638), PB was not 
subject to any legally significant risk that the renovations 
would falter.
57
  
 
In short, PB bore no meaningful risk in joining HBH, 
as it would have had it acquired a bona-fide partnership 
interest.  See ASA Investerings P’ship v. Comm’r, 201 F.3d 
505, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that the Tax Court did not 
err “by carving out an exception for de minimis risks” when 
assessing whether the parties assumed risk for the purpose of 
determining whether a partnership was valid for tax purposes, 
and determining that the decision not to consider de minimis 
risk was “consistent with the Supreme Court‟s view … that a 
transaction will be disregarded if it did „not appreciably affect 
[taxpayer‟s] beneficial interest except to reduce his tax‟” 
                                              
57
 Although the question of the existence of a risk is a 
factual issue we would review for clear error, there was 
certainly no error in acknowledging that there were risks 
associated with the rehabilitation.  The relevant question, 
here, however, is not the factual one of whether there was 
risk; it is the purely the legal question of how the parties 
agreed to divide that risk, or, in other words, whether a party 
to the transactions bore any legally significant risk under the 
governing documents.  That question – whether PB was 
subject to any legally meaningful risk in connection with the 
East Hall rehabilitation – depends on the AREA and related 
documents and hence is a question of law that we review de 
novo. 
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(alteration in original) (quoting Knetsch v. United States, 364 
U.S. 361, 366 (1960))).
58
   
 
PB‟s effective elimination of Investment Risk, Audit 
Risk, and Project Risk is evidenced by the “agreement … of 
the parties.” Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 742.  PB and NJSEA, in 
substance, did not join together in HBH‟s stated business 
purpose – to rehabilitate and operate the East Hall.  Rather, 
the parties‟ focus from the very beginning was to effect a sale 
and purchase of HRTCs.  (See J.A. at 691 (Sovereign‟s 
“consulting proposal … for the sale of historic rehabilitation 
tax credits expected to be generated” by the East Hall 
renovation); id. at 955 (Confidential Memorandum entitled 
“The Sale of Historic Tax Credits Generated by the 
Renovation of the Historic Atlantic City Boardwalk 
Convention Hall”); id. at 1143 (cover letter from Sovereign to 
NJSEA providing NJSEA “with four original investment 
offers from institutions that have responded to the 
                                              
58
 The Tax Court thought that “[PB] faced potential 
liability for environmental hazards from the rehabilitation.”  
(J.A. at 43.)  Specifically, it theorized that PB could be on the 
hook for environmental liability (1) if environmental 
insurance proceeds did not cover any such potential liability, 
and (2) NJSEA was unable to cover that difference.  In 
reality, however, PB was not subject to any real risk of 
environmental liability because of the Environmental 
Guaranty and the fact that PB had a priority distribution right 
to any environmental insurance proceeds that HBH received 
(HBH‟s counsel at oral argument indicated that HBH carried 
a $25 million policy).  Moreover, PB received a legal opinion 
that it would not be subject to any environmental liability 
associated with the East Hall renovation.    
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[Confidential] Memorandum regarding the purchase of the 
historic tax credits expected to be generated by” the East Hall 
renovation).)
59
  
 
That conclusion is not undermined by PB‟s receipt of a 
secondary benefit – the 3% Preferred Return on its 
contributions to HBH.  Although, in form, PB was “not 
guaranteed” that return on an annual basis if HBH did not 
generate sufficient cash flow (Appellee‟s Br. at 35), in 
substance, PB had the ability to ensure that it would 
eventually receive it.  If PB exercised its Put Option (or 
NJSEA exercised its Call Option), the purchase price to be 
paid by NJSEA was effectively measured by PB‟s accrued 
and unpaid Preferred Return.  See infra note 63 and 
accompanying text.  And to guarantee that there would be 
sufficient cash to cover that purchase price, NJSEA was 
required to purchase the Guaranteed Investment Contract in 
the event that NJSEA exercised its Call Option.
60
  Cf. 
Virginia Historic, 639 F.3d at 145 (noting the fact that 
“investors were promised what was, in essence, a fixed rate of 
                                              
59
 Although we do not “[p]ermit[] a taxpayer to control 
the economic destiny of a transaction with labels” when 
conducting a substance-over-form inquiry, Schering-Plough, 
Corp. v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 2d 219, 242 (D.N.J. 
2009), the labels chosen are indicative of what the parties 
were trying to accomplish and thus those labels “throw[] light 
on [the parties‟] true intent,” Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 742. 
60
 As noted supra in Section I.B.4.a, the Guaranteed 
Investment Contract was “sized to pay off” the accrued but 
unpaid Preferred Return, as well as the outstanding balance 
on the Investor Loan with accrued interest.  (J.A. at 1211.) 
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return on investment rather than any share in partnership 
profits tied to their partnership interests” “point[ed] to the 
conclusion that there was not true entrepreneurial risk faced 
by investors”).  Thus, the Tax Court‟s finding that PB “might 
not receive its preferred return … at all” unless NJSEA 
exercised its Call Option (J.A. at 51-52), was clearly 
erroneous because it ignored the reality that PB could assure 
its return by unilaterally exercising its Put Option.
61
 
 
HBH, of course, attacks the Commissioner‟s assertion 
that PB lacked downside risk, claiming that “the IRS‟s theory 
that a valid partnership cannot exist unless an investor-partner 
shares in all of the risks and costs of the partnership has no 
basis in partnership or tax law,” and “is contrary to the 
standard economic terms of innumerable real estate 
investment partnerships in the United States for every type of 
real estate project.”  (Appellee‟s Br. at 44.)  HBH also asserts 
that many of the negotiated provisions – such as the 
Completion Guaranty, Operating Deficit Guaranty, and the 
Preferred Return – are “typical in a real estate investment 
partnership.”  (Id. at 45.)  The Commissioner has not claimed, 
however, and we do not suggest, that a limited partner is 
prohibited from capping its risk at the amount it invests in a 
partnership.  Such a cap, in and of itself, would not jeopardize 
its partner status for tax purposes.  We also recognize that a 
limited partner‟s status as a bona fide equity participant will 
                                              
61
 It is true, of course, that PB could not exercise its 
Put Option until seven years from the date that the East Hall 
was placed in service.  However, PB would have no interest 
in exercising that option within the first five years anyway 
because the HRTCs that PB received would be subject to 
recapture during that period.  See supra note 20. 
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not be stripped away merely because it has successfully 
negotiated measures that minimize its risk of losing a portion 
of its investment in an enterprise.  Here, however, the parties 
agreed to shield PB‟s “investment” from any meaningful risk.  
PB was assured of receiving the value of the HRTCs and its 
Preferred Return regardless of the success or failure of the 
rehabilitation of the East Hall and HBH‟s subsequent 
operations.  And that lack of meaningful risk weighs heavily 
in determining whether PB is a bona fide partner in HBH.  Cf. 
Virginia Historic, 639 F.3d at 145-46 (explaining that 
“entrepreneurial risks of partnership operations” involves 
placing “money into a venture with the hope that it might 
grow in amount but with the knowledge that it may well 
shrink”); Castle Harbour, 459 F.3d at 232 (noting that 
“Congress appears to have intended that „the significant 
factor‟ in differentiating between [debt and equity] be 
whether „the funds were advanced with reasonable 
expectations of repayment regardless of the success of the 
venture or were placed at the risk of the business‟” (quoting 
Gilbert v. Comm’r, 248 F.2d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 1957))). 
 
2. Lack of Meaningful Upside Potential 
 
PB‟s avoidance of all meaningful downside risk in 
HBH was accompanied by a dearth of any meaningful upside 
potential.  “Whether [a putative partner] is free to, and does, 
enjoy the fruits of the partnership is strongly indicative of the 
reality of his participation in the enterprise.”  Culbertson, 337 
U.S. at 747.  PB, in substance, was not free to enjoy the fruits 
of HBH.  Like the foreign banks‟ illusory 98% interest in 
Castle Harbour, PB‟s 99.9% interest in HBH‟s residual cash 
flow gave a false impression that it had a chance to share in 
potential profits of HBH.  In reality, PB would only benefit 
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from its 99.9% interest in residual cash flow after payments to 
it on its Investor Loan and Preferred Return and the following 
payments to NJSEA: (1) annual installment payment on the 
Acquisition Loan ($3,580,840 annual payment for 39 years 
plus arrears); (2) annual installment payment on the 
Construction Loan;
62
 and (3) payment in full of the operating 
deficit loan (in excess of $28 million as of 2007).  Even 
HBH‟s own rosy financial projections from 2000 to 2042, 
which (at least through 2007) had proven fantastically 
inaccurate, forecasted no residual cash flow available for 
distribution.  Thus, although in form PB had the potential to 
receive the fair market value of its interest (assuming such 
value was greater than its accrued but unpaid Preferred 
Return) if either NJSEA exercised its Call Option or PB 
exercised its Put Option, in reality, PB could never expect to 
share in any upside.
63
  Cf. Castle Harbour, 459 F.3d at 234 
                                              
62
 The Construction Loan called for annual interest-
only payments until April 30, 2002, and thereafter, called for 
annual installments of principal and interest that would fully 
pay off the amount of the principal as then had been advanced 
by April 30, 2040.  Under the original principal amount of 
$57,215,733 with an interest rate of 0.1% over a 39-year 
period, and assuming no arrearage in the payment of principal 
and interest, the annual installment of principal and interest 
would be approximately $1.5 million.   
63
 To put it mildly, the parties and their advisors were 
imaginative in creating financial projections to make it appear 
that HBH would be a profit-making enterprise.  For example, 
after Sovereign said that it was “cautious about [Spectacor‟s 
projections of net losses for HBH since] they might prove 
excessively conservative” (J.A. at 793), and suggested that 
NJSEA “could explore shifting the burden of some of 
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[HBH‟s] operating expenses … to improve results” (id. at 
804), Spectacor made two sets of revisions to HBH‟s five-
year draft projections that turned an annual average $1.7 
million net operating loss to annual net operating gains 
ranging from $716,000 to $1.24 million by removing HBH‟s 
projected utilities expenses for each of the five years.  
Similarly, when an accountant from Reznick informed 
Hoffman that the two proposed loans from NJSEA to HBH 
“ha[d] been set up to be paid from available cash flow” but 
that “[t]here was not sufficient cash to amortize this debt” (id. 
at 1160),   Hoffman instructed that accountant to remedy that 
issue by increasing the projection of baseline revenues in 
2002 by $1 million by adding a new revenue source of 
$750,000 titled “naming rights,” and by increasing both 
“parking revenue” and “net concession revenue” by $125,000 
each (id. at 1196).  Overall, although Reznick projected near 
closing that HBH would generate an aggregate net operating 
income of approximately $9.9 million for 2003 through 2007, 
HBH actually experienced an aggregate net operating loss of 
over $10.5 million for those five years.   
Despite the smoke and mirrors of the financial 
projections, the parties‟ behind-the-scenes statements reveal 
that they never anticipated that the fair market value of PB‟s 
interest would exceed PB‟s accrued but unpaid Preferred 
Return.  (See id. at 1162 (pre-closing memo from NJSEA‟s 
outside counsel to NJSEA that “[d]ue to the structure of the 
transaction,” the fair market value would not come into play 
in determining the amount that PB would be owed if NJSEA 
exercised its Call Option).)  That admission is hardly 
surprising because the substance of the transaction indicated 
that this was not a profit-generating enterprise.  Cf. Virginia 
Historic, 639 F.3d at 145 (noting that the fact that “the Funds 
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(“The realistic possibility of upside potential – not the 
absence of formal caps – is what governs [the bona fide 
equity participation] analysis.”).  Even if there were an 
upside, however, NJSEA could exercise its Consent Option, 
and cut PB out by paying a purchase price unrelated to any 
fair market value.
64
  See supra Section I.B.4.a.  In sum, “the 
structure of the … transaction ensured that [PB] would never 
receive any [economic benefits from HBH].”  Southgate 
Master Fund, 659 F.3d at 486-87.  And “[i]n light of 
Culbertson‟s identification of „the actual control of income 
and the purposes for which it [was] used‟ as a metric of a 
partnership‟s legitimacy, the terms of the [AREA and the 
structure of the various options] constitute compelling 
evidence” that PB was not a bona fide partner in HBH.  Id. at 
486 (quoting Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 742). 
 
3. HBH’s Reliance on Form over Substance  
 
After attempting to downplay PB‟s lack of any 
meaningful stake in the success or failure of the enterprise, 
HBH presses us to consider certain evidence that it believes 
“overwhelmingly proves that [PB] is a partner in HBH” under 
                                                                                                     
… explicitly told investors to expect no allocation of material 
amounts of … partnership items of income, gain, loss, or 
deduction” “point[ed] to the conclusion that there was no true 
entrepreneurial risk faced by investors” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)).   
64
 Thus, contrary to HBH‟s assertion, NJSEA 
effectively did have the “right to divest [PB] of its interest in 
any income or gains from the East Hall.”  (Appellee‟s Br. at 
35.) 
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the Culbertson totality-of-the-circumstances test.  (Appellee‟s 
Br. at 38.)  That “overwhelming” evidence includes: (1) that 
HBH was duly organized as an LLC under New Jersey law 
and, as the AREA provides, “was formed to acquire, develop, 
finance, rehabilitate, maintain, operate, license, and sell or 
otherwise to dispose of the East Hall” (id. at 40; see J.A. at 
157); (2) PB‟s “net economic benefit” from the HRTCs and 
the 3% Preferred Return (Appellee‟s Br.  at 41); (3) PB‟s 
representatives‟ “vigorous[] negotiat[ion] [of] the terms of the 
AREA” (id. at 41); (4) “the nature and thoroughness” of PB‟s 
“comprehensive due diligence investigation in connection 
with its investment in HBH” (id. at 42); (5) PB‟s “substantial 
financial investment in HBH” (id.); (6) various business 
agreements that had been entered into between NJSEA and 
certain third parties that were all assigned to, and assumed by, 
HBH (id. at 43); (7) bank and payroll accounts that were 
opened in HBH‟s name and insurance agreements that were 
amended to identify HBH as an owner and include PB as an 
additional insured; and (8) the fact that, following closing, 
“NJSEA kept in constant communication with [PB] regarding 
the renovations to the East Hall, and the business operations 
of the Hall” (id.).   
 
Much of that evidence may give an “outward 
appearance of an arrangement to engage in a common 
enterprise.”  Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 752 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring).  But “the sharp eyes of the law” require more 
from parties than just putting on the “habiliments of a 
partnership whenever it advantages them to be treated as 
partners underneath.”  Id.  Indeed, Culbertson requires that a 
partner “really and truly intend[] to … shar[e] in the profits 
and losses” of the enterprise, id. at 741 (majority opinion) 
(emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks 
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omitted), or, in other words, have a “meaningful stake in the 
success or failure” of the enterprise, Castle Harbour, 459 
F.3d at 231.  Looking past the outward appearance, HBH‟s 
cited evidence does not demonstrate such a meaningful stake. 
 
First, the recitation of partnership formalities – that 
HBH was duly organized, that it had a stated purpose under 
the AREA, that it opened bank and payroll accounts, and that 
it assumed various obligation – misses the point.  We are 
prepared to accept for purposes of argument that there was 
economic substance to HBH.  The question is whether PB had 
a meaningful stake in that enterprise.  See Castle Harbour, 
459 F.3d at 232 (“The IRS‟s challenge to the taxpayer‟s 
characterization is not foreclosed merely because the taxpayer 
can point to the existence of some business purpose or 
objective reality in addition to its tax-avoidance objective.”); 
Southgate Master Fund, 659 F.3d at 484 (“The fact that a 
partnership‟s underlying business activities had economic 
substance does not, standing alone, immunize the partnership 
from judicial scrutiny [under Culbertson].  The parties‟ 
selection of the partnership form must have been driven by a 
genuine business purpose.” (internal footnote omitted)).  To 
answer that, we must “look beyond the superficial formalities 
of a transaction to determine the proper tax treatment.”  
Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 436 (5th Cir. 
1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Second, evidence that PB received a “net economic 
benefit” from HBH and made a “substantial financial 
investment in HBH” can only support a finding that PB is a 
bona fide partner if there was a meaningful intent to share in 
the profits and the losses of that investment.  The structure of 
PB‟s “investment,” however, shows clearly that there was no 
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such intent.  Recovery of each of the contributions that made 
up the “substantial financial investment” was assured by the 
provisions of the AREA and the Tax Benefits Guaranty.  
And, as the Commissioner rightly notes, PB‟s net after-tax 
economic benefit from the transaction – in the form of the 
HRTCs (or the cash equivalent via the Tax Benefits 
Guaranty) and the effectively guaranteed Preferred Return – 
“merely demonstrates [PB‟s] intent to make an economically 
rational use of its money on an after-tax basis.”  (Appellant‟s 
Reply Br. at 13.)  Indeed, both parties in a transaction such as 
this one will always think they are going to receive a net 
economic benefit; otherwise, the transaction would never 
occur.  If in fact that was the test, there would be a green-light 
for every tax-structured transaction that calls itself a 
“partnership.” 
 
Third, the fact that NJSEA “kept in constant 
communication” regarding the East Hall is hardly surprising.  
As discussed earlier, supra Section II.C.1, each installment 
contribution from PB was contingent upon NJSEA verifying 
that a certain amount of work had been completed on the East 
Hall so that PB was assured it would not be contributing more 
money than it would be guaranteed to receive in HRTCs or 
their cash equivalent.  The mere fact that a party receives 
regular updates on a project does not transform it into a bona 
fide partner for tax purposes. 
 
 Fourth, looking past the form of the transaction to its 
substance, neither PB‟s “vigorous[] negotiat[ion]” nor its 
“comprehensive due diligence investigation” is, in this 
context, indicative of an intent to be a bona fide partner in 
HBH.  We do not doubt that PB spent a significant amount of 
time conducting a thorough investigation and negotiating 
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favorable terms.  And we acknowledge that one of the factors 
cited by Culbertson is “the conduct of the parties in execution 
of its provisions.”  337 U.S. at 742.  But the record reflects 
that those efforts were made so that PB would not be subject 
to any real risks that would stand in the way of its receiving 
the value of the HRTCs; not, as HBH asserts, “to form a true 
business relationship.”  (Appellee‟s Br. at 41.)  We do not 
believe that courts are compelled to respect a taxpayer‟s 
characterization of a transaction for tax purposes based on 
how document-intensive the transaction becomes.  Recruiting 
teams of lawyers, accountants, and tax consultants does not 
mean that a partnership, with all its tax credit gold, can be 
conjured from a zero-risk investment of the sort PB made 
here. 
 
In the end, the evidence HBH cites focuses only on 
form, not substance.  From the moment Sovereign 
approached NJSEA, the substance of any transaction with a 
corporate investor was calculated to be a “sale of … historic 
rehabilitation tax credits.”  (J.A. at 691.)  Cf. Castle Harbour, 
459 F.3d at 236 (finding that the banks‟ interest “was more in 
the nature of window dressing designed to give ostensible 
support to the characterization of equity participation … than 
a meaningful stake in the profits of the venture”).  And in the 
end, that is what the substance turned out to be. 
 
Like the Virginia Historic court, we reach our 
conclusion mindful of Congress‟s goal of encouraging 
rehabilitation of historic buildings.  See 639 F.3d at 146 n.20.  
We have not ignored the predictions of HBH and amici that, 
if we reallocate the HRTCs away from PB, we may 
jeopardize the viability of future historic rehabilitation 
projects.  Those forecasts, however, distort the real dispute.  
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The HRTC statute “is not under attack here.”  Id.  It is the 
prohibited sale of tax credits, not the tax credit provision 
itself, that the IRS has challenged.  Where the line lies 
between a defensible distribution of risk and reward in a 
partnership on the one hand and a form-over-substance 
violation of the tax laws on the other is not for us to say in the 
abstract.  But, “[w]here, as here, we confront taxpayers who 
have taken a circuitous route to reach an end more easily 
accessible by a straightforward path, we look to the substance 
over form.”  Southgate Master Fund, 659 F.3d at 491 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  And, after 
looking to the substance of the interests at play in this case, 
we conclude that, because PB lacked a meaningful stake in 
either the success or failure of HBH, it was not a bona fide 
partner 
.   
III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the Tax 
Court‟s January 3, 2011 decision, and remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
